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Abstract This article develops a comprehensive philosophy-of-science for person-
ality psychology that goes far beyond the scope of the lexical approaches, assessment
methods, and trait concepts that currently prevail. One of the field’s most important
guiding scientific assumptions, the lexical hypothesis, is analysed from meta-
theoretical viewpoints to reveal that it explicitly describes two sets of phenomena
that must be clearly differentiated: 1) lexical repertoires and the representations that
they encode and 2) the kinds of phenomena that are represented. Thus far, personality
psychologists largely explored only the former, but have seriously neglected studying
the latter. Meta-theoretical analyses of these different kinds of phenomena and their
distinct natures, commonalities, differences, and interrelations reveal that personality
psychology’s focus on lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts
entails a) erroneous meta-theoretical assumptions about what the phenomena being
studied actually are, and thus how they can be analysed and interpreted, b) that
contemporary personality psychology is largely based on everyday psychological
knowledge, and c) a fundamental circularity in the scientific explanations used in trait
psychology. These findings seriously challenge the widespread assumptions about the
causal and universal status of the phenomena described by prominent personality
models. The current state of knowledge about the lexical hypothesis is reviewed, and
implications for personality psychology are discussed. Ten desiderata for future
research are outlined to overcome the current paradigmatic fixations that are substan-
tially hampering intellectual innovation and progress in the field.
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Science provides a special way of constructing knowledge about the world. Unlike
nonscientific knowledge construction, science provides a way of thinking simulta-
neously about phenomena and the means of producing knowledge about them—this
presupposes meta-theory and methodology (Althusser and Balibar 1970; Toomela
2011). Meta-theory refers to the philosophical assumptions about the theoretical
nature of the phenomena to be studied and to the questions that are asked about
them. Methodology refers to the ways (i.e., approaches) in which these questions can
be answered and to the techniques (i.e., methods) that can therefore be used (Sprung
and Sprung 1984).
All sciences have meta-theories. They determine which elements of real
phenomena can be reduced to precisely those subsets of elements that are
considered relevant to and defining of concrete scientific phenomena and the
ways in which they can be reduced (Althusser and Balibar 1970, p. 84, analysing
the philosophy of science of Marx 1867; Køppe 2012; Weber 1949). Meta-
theories determine what is considered data in a particular field (in a particular
historical time; Kuhn 1962), and how the thus-defined data can be analysed and
interpreted (Køppe 2012; Wagoner 2009). Hence, the first step of reducing real
elements into facts is already a theoretical decision (Weber 1949, p. 173). “Alles
Faktische ist schon Theorie”—all facts are already theory (Goethe 1907, p. 127).
In other words, “it is the theory which decides what can be observed” (Einstein
to Heisenberg in 1926, cited in Heisenberg 1989, p. 10). Meta-theories and
methodologies are the rules that govern the effective practices of sciences.
Therefore, they should be explicated to enable researchers to constantly scruti-
nise all levels from epistemology and ontology up to the specific theories about
the phenomena studied (Toomela 2011). This also includes rethinking the very
reduction of real phenomena into scientific phenomena (Utz 2005).
Contemporary psychology largely follows meta-theory and methodology im-
plicitly, sometimes even “blindly” (Toomela 2011, p. 22)—this occurs in partic-
ular when research methods are decided first and research questions are adapted
to the methods rather than vice versa (Omi 2012; Westen 1996). “The under-
standing that research methodology comprises an essential part of scientific
theories about phenomena that are studied is not always brought into the center
of theoretical reasoning” (Toomela 2009, p. 45). Ignoring the meta-theoretical
assumptions underlying particular methods can result in mismatches between
methods and research questions that hamper the scientific understanding and
the explanations of the phenomena being studied—and thus scientific progress
(Loftus 1996; Toomela and Valsiner 2010; Weber 1949). More profoundly, a
priori decisions on methods preclude posing the primary question of what the
phenomena to be studied actually are (Toomela 2011).
These meta-theoretical and methodological challenges are characteristic of con-
temporary personality psychology and of taxonomic personality research in particular
(Uher 2008a, b, 2011a, b; Uher, Methodological approaches to personality taxono-
mies: The Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach—A non-
lexical alternative, unpublished). The “discovery” of five major dimensions of indi-
vidual differences is considered a milestone in modern Western psychology (De Raad
1998; Digman 1990; Goldberg 1990). This “break through” was made possible by the
assumption that people encode in their everyday languages all those individual
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differences that they perceive as most salient in everyday encounters and that they
consider to be socially relevant. This so-called lexical hypothesis, first articulated by
Galton (1884), has provided a stringent rationale for using the lexica of human
languages as finite sources of information to unravel a few major dimensions of
individual differences (Allport and Odbert 1936; Cattell 1943). In English and some
other languages, the reduction of the pertinent lexical repertoires to five major
dimensions has received the most support in Western scientific communities
(Goldberg 1993; John et al. 1988). The lexical hypothesis also suggests that enquiring
about the everyday psychological ideas that people develop of themselves and of
other individuals could be a suitable method for the scientific measurement of
personality (Block 2010; Westen 1996). Assessments by laypeople have become
the standard methods of investigation (Baumeister et al. 2007; Matthews et al.
2003) and the “primary source of data” in personality psychology (Schwarz 1999,
p. 93). The assumptions expressed in the lexical hypothesis might also contribute to
the fact that the prevailing strategies of the scientific explanation of individual
differences largely follow structures that are deeply rooted in everyday psychology.
In spite of its enormous importance as one of the most widely used theoretical
assumptions to have guided personality psychology (Ashton and Lee 2005), the
lexical hypothesis has remained untested (Toomela 2010a; Westen 1996), and still
today, its statements have been considered only partially. This article systematically
explores the meta-theoretical assumptions that underlie this hypothesis. It starts by
highlighting the explicit reference of the lexical hypothesis to two sets of phenomena
that must be clearly differentiated; these are, on the one hand, people’s lexical
repertoires and the representations that these repertoires encode, and, on the other
hand, the kinds of phenomena that are perceivable in everyday life and that are being
represented. Thus far, personality psychology has focused primarily on just one of
these two sets—on lexically encoded representations—but has failed to systemati-
cally investigate the second set, namely, the kinds of phenomena that are being
perceived and represented.
This article elaborates the distinct natures of the different kinds of phenomena to
which the lexical hypothesis refers and explores their commonalities, differences, and
interrelations from a philosophy-of-science perspective. This allows for scrutiny to be
applied to the phenomena that are being lexically encoded and sheds new light on the
fundamental questions of which kinds of phenomena can actually be captured by
assessments—and which ones cannot. These analyses reveal that erroneous meta-
theoretical assumptions underlie the established beliefs about what these phenomena
actually are. They show that contemporary personality psychology is largely based on
everyday psychological knowledge. Furthermore, the present meta-theoretical anal-
yses allow us to scrutinise the prevailing psychological strategy of explaining indi-
vidual differences—explicitly or implicitly—by assuming the existence of “traits”.
The philosophy-of-science perspective identifies explanations based on trait concepts
as fundamentally circular. These findings seriously challenge the established assump-
tions about the causal and universal status of the phenomena described by prominent
personality models.
Various researchers have carefully crafted serious concerns about the established five
factor models of personality (e.g., Block 1995, 2001, 2010; Eysenck 1992; McAdams
1992; Westen 1996), about assessment data and their interpretation (e.g., Brower 1949;
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Michell 1997, 2003; Omi 2012; Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011; Schwarz 2009; Trendler
2009; Valsiner 2012), and about the explanations provided by trait psychology (e.g.,
Allport 1961; Bock 2000; Cervone et al. 2001; Lamiell 2003; Mischel and Shoda 1994,
1995). This article moves these critical objections coherently to meta-theoretical and
methodological levels of consideration. It expands them substantially from the
philosophy-of-science perspective and elaborates a fundamental critique of the lexical
approaches, assessments by laypeople, and trait concepts that currently dominate per-
sonality psychology. It closes by outlining 10 desiderata for future research to overcome
the limitations revealed in the analyses and to stimulate new directions in the field.
Lexical Encodings—Constructs and Representations
The lexical hypothesis states that people encode in their everyday languages all those
differences between individuals that they perceive to be salient and that they consider
to be socially relevant in their everyday lives. Encodings about differences within
individuals over time are not explicitly mentioned, however (see below). Among the
many phenomena that individuals can perceive, recurrent patterns are particularly
meaningful because such patterns may allow predictions of future events while facing
the uncertainty of the future. Individuals therefore seek to identify recurrent patterns
in their experiences with their personal world (Kelly 1955). To describe, explain, and
to predict the likely occurrences of events, people construct and represent their
experiences in private ideas (Valsiner 2012). These ideas are called subjective or
individual representations (Jovchelovitch 2007; Moscovici 1984). Representations
referring to experiences with one’s own person and the—especially social—world are
called personal constructs in personality psychology (Kelly 1955).
To communicate their perceptions and mental constructs of what they perceive and
to negotiate socially shared meanings in order to cope with the world collectively,
groups of individuals create and use social constructs. These constructs are called
intersubjective or social representations (Jovchelovitch 2007) or folk concepts in
personality psychology (Tellegen 1993). Constructs and representations referring to
the perceptions of persons are called personality constructs. The lexical hypothesis
states that, over time, socially shared constructs of self- and other-perception become
encoded in the natural human languages. Pertinent lexical encodings reflect the body
of everyday psychological ideas, beliefs, values, and practices that people have
developed about individuals (Block 2010; Wagner et al. 1999; Westen 1996).
What is Constructed and Represented—Phenomena and Patterns
What is it that is constructed and represented as “personality”? Psychological defi-
nitions of personality—a few prominent ones picked out of many—provide the first
insights into what scientific psychologists construct as personality. Some frequently
cited definitions refer fairly generally and descriptively to personality as
those characteristics that account for a person’s consistent patterns of feeling,
thinking, and behaving (Pervin and John 1997, p. 4) or as
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an individual’s characteristic patterns of thought, emotion, and behaviour,
together with the psychological mechanisms–hidden or not–behind those pat-
terns (Funder 2004, p. 5).
These definitions include psychological and behavioural phenomena. Allport
(1937) also included psychophysical systems and environmental adaptivity by defin-
ing personality as
the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems
that determine his unique adjustments to his environment (p. 48).
Eysenck (1947) furthermore specified genetic and environmental causality, bio-
logical systems, and ontogenetic development when he defined personality as
the sum-total of the actual or potential behaviour-patterns of the organism, as
determined by heredity and environment; [that] originates and develops through
the functional interaction of the four main sectors into which these behaviour-
patterns are organized: the cognitive sector (intelligence), the conative sector
(character), the affective sector (temperament), and the somatic sector
(constitution) (p. 25).
McCrae and Costa (2008) extended the scope of consideration by conceptualising
particular personality constructs as reflecting “universals” of human nature that are
“invariant across human cultures” (McCrae and Costa 1997, p. 510), and thus also
potentially phylogenetic in origin (McCrae 2009).
These definitions are sufficient for highlighting fundamental issues. First, they
refer descriptively to particular patterns (e.g., those described as “characteristic”
and “consistent”) and to the different kinds of phenomena in which these patterns
occur (e.g., physiological, psychological, and behavioural phenomena). Second,
they include assumptions about the causation of the described patterns in the
described phenomena by other kinds of phenomena internal to the individual
(e.g., psychological phenomena) and/or external (e.g., environmental conditions)
considering various explanatory perspectives (e.g., proximate, adaptive, ontoge-
netic, phylogenetic). Astonishingly, there is no mention of people’s lexical
encodations and representations of individual differences although these are
central to the lexical hypothesis.
From philosophy-of-science perspectives, the different kinds of phenomena
studied with regard to personality must be clearly differentiated. This is essential
because interrelations among them can be untangled only if they are explored
each in their own right and if a priori assumptions about specific interrelations
are avoided. This is rarely done in psychology. Behaviourists have focused too
much on external conditions and behaviours, but have largely ignored psycho-
logical phenomena. Subsequent researchers have tried to overcome the limita-
tions of behaviourism and have therefore focused strongly on psychological
phenomena and on individuals’ representations of their world, but behaviour
has faded into the background. The prevailing investigative strategies are preoc-
cupied with causal processes and the conditions in which behavioural phenomena
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occur—especially psychological ones—with the result that clear differentiations
of psychological and behavioural phenomena are missing.
The meta-theoretical definition of behavioural phenomena as “external activities
or externalisations of living organisms that are functionally mediated by the environ-
ment (Millikan 1993) in the present” (Uher, What is behaviour? And (when) is
language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, unpublished) allows such differ-
entiations. This definition highlights the intrinsic relatedness of behaviour to proper-
ties of the immediate external environment that are defined as environmental
situations and emphasises that it is inherently bound to the present. Externality
differentiates behaviour from thoughts, emotions, and other psychological phenom-
ena, which are also bound to the present (Gillespie and Zittaun 2010; Toomela 2010a;
Valsiner 1998, 2012) but are internal to the individual (Toomela 2008). This meta-
theoretical definition generally defines all behavioural phenomena without specifying
particular ones (e.g., goal-directed action or response) because many of these con-
cepts include a priori assumptions about causally related internal processes (e.g.,
psychological phenomena) and external conditions in the environment (e.g., partic-
ular stimuli) that are separate kinds of phenomena. To scrutinise which kinds of
phenomena people can perceive in everyday life and construct as personality, it is
helpful to first specify the particular patterns referred to in definitions of personality.
Defining Patterns
For scientific definitions, the notions of “a person’s consistent patterns”, “individual
characteristics”, and “individual uniqueness” are surprisingly vague. They do not
specify what is meant to be “consistent” with what, nor do they indicate which patterns
are considered “different, “unique”, and “characteristic” and why. Moreover, they fail to
mention within-individual variability and structural complexity—both within and be-
tween individuals. This is remarkable because these patterns refer to phenomena (e.g.,
those of the psyche and of behaviour) that are heterogeneous, complex, dynamic, and
thus highly fluctuating. In such phenomena, differences among individuals are neces-
sarily apparent at any given time (Uher 2011a) and determinations of meaningful
consistency—both within and between individuals—are matters of mere convention.
Meta-theoretical analyses help to carve out basic criteria for determining which patterns
can be considered specific to particular individuals, and thus different from others,
which ones cannot, and why. So what does individual-specificity mean?
Probabilistic Patterns In the steadily fluctuating flow of events in highly dynamic
phenomena, individuals necessarily show considerable within-individual variability
over time. Consequently, they can be characterised only by probabilistic patterns.
What types of probability1 are able to describe these patterns? First, events of
psychological and behavioural phenomena are not random, such as events in throws
of dice. There are no equipossible elementary events in well-defined sample spaces
that can be studied in repeated experiments as in Laplacian theory. Moreover, the
1 For the present meta-theoretical analyses, theories considering subjectivistic probabilities of the occur-
rences of events (e.g., degrees of belief; Gillies 2000; Rychlak 1968) will not be considered here (for
reasons described in detail below).
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events are not independent from one another—this applies to events of the same
phenomenon (e.g., several smiles) as well as to events of different phenomena (e.g., a
smile and a laugh). Rather, different events may co-occur and even depend upon one
another, particularly if the phenomena are functionally similar or related. Their events
need not be exclusively disjunctive (e.g., smiles and laughs). Thus, finite (limiting)
frequencies, which are defined as empirical occurrences relative to all possible
occurrences (von Mises 1928), are inadequate for describing individual probabilities
in psychological and behavioural phenomena.
The concept of propensity probabilities seems to be better suited for this purpose.
Propensities are considered properties of physical objects or situations that are assumed
to cause empirical frequencies, even if only single-case observations are made (Popper
1959). They are therefore conceived also as properties of repeatable conditions that
determine empirical frequencies in the long run (Gillies 2000).2 But this very assump-
tion precludes the idea that propensity probabilities can be applied to individuals
because their defining property as living systems is the fact that they undergo continuous
changes during ontogenetic development. This is true for the molecules in their bodies
and the phenomena constructed as personality alike. In fact, personality is assumed to
develop and change gradually over the course of the lifespan (e.g., Caspi and Roberts
2001; Cattell 1950; Soldz and Vaillant 1999). This implies that the individual’s empirical
frequencies cannot converge (i.e., stabilise) in the long run as may be true for physical
systems. By contrast, the probabilities themselves change over time—an idea typically
not considered by theories of propensity probabilities (cf. Gillies 2000; Popper 1959).
Further differences are essential. In psychological and behavioural phenomena,
there are no discrete events such as there are in coin tosses. Well-defined natural
entities on which probability estimations could be based are lacking. Instead, it is the
scientists who must decide which entities of real phenomena make up particular
scientific phenomena. The ways in which they define entities as categories depend
not only on the phenomena themselves, but also on the purposes of their reduction
(Weber 1949). Moreover, the processual character and microgenetic development of
many psychological and behavioural phenomena (Rosenthal 2004) entails that their
occurrences can be construed as frequencies only in some cases. In other cases, they
may be construed more accurately as durations of nonfixed and often highly variable
length (or as latencies, which are durations with specified start times).
Consequently, in fluctuating phenomena such as those of the psyche and of
behaviour, events can be considered only by their empirical occurrences (i.e., in
terms of frequencies and durations) relative to particular time periods. This new
probability type will therefore be called a time-relative probability. For example, in
observations of free play in a kindergarten group, a time-relative probability of
10 min per hour of observation time during which a child plays by him/herself may
be determined for a particular 5-year-old child. The time periods in which time-
relative probabilities are determined must be specified precisely—both in terms of the
occasions and spans of time in which the data were collected to determine the
probabilities and in terms of historical times in the individual’s ontogeny. Both are
2 The concept of propensity probabilities reifies observed properties into causal entities of an unkown and
undefined kind. As such, the explanatory strategy is inherently circular and faces the same challenges as
those elaborated for trait psychology in this article.
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essential to define individual-specificity. For example, the 10 min per hour probabil-
ity could have been determined from 20 h of regular observation obtained across a
time period of 2 weeks; the ontogenetic stage of the individual is specified by an age
of 5 years, which can be categorised as early childhood.
This new probability type enables ratio-scaled quantifications that are essential for
quantitative comparisons across time and situational contexts and between individuals,
groups, populations, and species (Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity
versus subjectivity in quantifications of behaviour and personality; An integrative
meta-theoretical framework for research on individual behaviour in context—situa-
tions, populations, species, both unpublished). It also allows for the merging of
concepts of averages across occasions, as studied in personality research, with concepts
of ranges, especially maxima, as studied in intelligence and achievement research3
(Ackerman 1994), and concepts of variability in terms of differences between consec-
utive occasions (i.e., fluctuations) as studied in physiological and behavioural research
(De Weerth et al. 1999). For example, the child’s time-relative probability could be on
average 10 min per hour, ranging from 5 to 20 min per hour on a daily basis; the
magnitude of day-to-day variability (for comparable occasions across the days) as
indicated by the coefficient of variation could be CV=0.5. This coefficient specifies
the standard deviation standardised by the mean (because the standard deviation is
sensitive to the sample mean) to allow for comparisons between different samples (for
an overview of methods of analyses of variability, see van Geert and van Dijk 2002).
Such comprehensive analyses of patterns are important because within-individual var-
iability in psychological and behavioural phenomena is pronounced and bears theoret-
ical and empirical importance. For example, within-individual variability can indicate
ongoing processes and can reflect phenomena that are important for explaining changes
and development (van Geert and van Dijk 2002, p. 344). Moreover, within-individual
variability often substantially exceeds between-individual variability (Shweder and
Sullivan 1990; Uher, An integrative meta-theoretical framework for research on indi-
vidual behaviour in context—situations, populations, species, unpublished).
Differential Patterns Time-relative probabilities that characterise all individuals in
the same way cannot be individual-specific. If all children in the observed group have
the same time-relative probability of self-playing, then these probabilities cannot
characterise any one of them individually. Time-relative probabilities can reflect
individual uniqueness only if they deviate from those of other individuals of a
particular reference group of interest (e.g., a social group, culture, or species)—that
is, if they are differential. This is the case if the determined time-relative probabilities
differ between children such that their individual averages vary interindividually, for
example, between 2 min and 30 min per hour, their individual ranges vary, for
example, between 15 min and 50 min, and their individual within-individual varia-
bilities vary, for example, between CV=0.3 and 1.3.
The concept of time-relative probabilities presupposes that the number of occa-
sions and periods of time considered for the probability estimations are comparable
3 Personality research is often distinguished from intelligence research in American psychology. In
European traditions (e.g., Cattell, Eysenck, Stern, Pawlik), intelligence and achievement are considered
inherent parts of an individual’s personality.
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between individuals. This is important when considering the effects of aggregation on
the reliability of probability estimations (cf. Spearman 1910) and when taking into
account the fact that the individuals’ probabilities themselves may gradually change
over time (i.e., develop). In the given example, this means that the time-relative
probabilities of the other children should also be estimated based on 20 h of
observation across a time span of 2 weeks. These children should also be of similar
age in order to disentangle differences between individuals from differences between
age groups. Furthermore, the situational contexts in which different individuals are
studied should be comparable between them because the average time-relative
probabilities of particular groups of individuals may generally shift across different
situations (Uher, An integrative meta-theoretical framework for research on individ-
ual behaviour in context—situations, populations, species, unpublished.) Analyses of
differentiality therefore require statistical standardisation of time-relative probabilities
within the time periods and within the situational contexts in which they are deter-
mined (Uher 2011a). Statistical standardisation removes the information on absolute
time-relative probability scores, however, because the data are converted into relative,
but still ratio-scaled data. Yet, the absolute scores can always be traced when needed
for interpretation and for later comparisons with other samples or with future inves-
tigations of the same sample.
Temporal Patterns Differential patterns in time-relative probabilities that change
rapidly cannot characterise an individual’s uniqueness. To reflect individual-
specificity, they must be stable across time periods that are longer than those in
which the probabilities were first ascertained. As with the analyses of differential
patterns, the analyses of temporal patterns presuppose that probability estimations are
based on numbers of occasions and periods of time that are comparable between the
individuals being studied and between the time periods being contrasted. In the above
example, this means that the differential patterns in the children’s time-relative
probabilities for self-play should be similar when estimated again some time later
in a second period of 2 weeks. Temporal stability is an essential prerequisite for
justifying interpretations of the obtained standardised aggregate scores as reflecting
individual-specific patterns (Uher 2011a).
Temporal stability can be analysed for differential patterns in the individuals’
averages, ranges, and variabilities. For example, it is quite possible that individuals
with similar differential scores in their average probabilities will differ from one
another in stable ways with regard to their ranges and patterns of within-individual
variability. The magnitude of temporal stability considered meaningful to construct
individual-specificity is necessarily a matter of convention that can and must be
explicitly defined. It depends on the ontogenetic stages of the individuals under study
as well as on their species-specific life expectancy (Uher 2009). It also depends on the
phenomena being studied and the meta-theory used. For example, in biology, weak
test-retest correlations of individual differences in behaviour across just a few days or
weeks of r=.20 are considered ecologically and evolutionarily meaningful (Sih and
Bell 2008), whereas in human psychology, such weak correlations are considered
indicators of unreliable measurements of individual-specific patterns (Uher 2011a).
In conclusion, for fluctuating and dynamic phenomena such as those of the psyche
and behaviour, individual-specificity refers to differential patterns in time-relative
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probabilities that are stable in ways that are considered to be meaningful. This
concept fits well into Brunswik’s (1955) probabilistic theory for functional psychol-
ogy. Brunswik ascertained that although the environment may be lawful in terms of
physical principles, to the individual, “it presents itself as semi-erratic… therefore all
functional psychology is inherently probabilistic” (Brunswik 1955, p. 193). An
empirical application of this meta-theoretical concept of individual-specificity to
behaviour was demonstrated in a study on capuchin monkeys based on 141 con-
textualised behavioural variables (Uher et al., Contextualised behavioural measure-
ments of personality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations
in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), unpublished).
Individual-specific patterns that have been identified in these ways can be subse-
quently studied across longer periods of time to explore patterns in their gradual
change and ontogenetic development (Uher 2011a). This presupposes again that the
occasions and time spans as well as the historical times that are studied should be
specified and should be comparable between the individuals under study.
The concept of time-relative probabilities allows for the close examination of individ-
ual cases in specified situations. By studying many individuals in this way, it also allows
for the study of lawful patterns at the sample level. The former type of study is commonly
referred to as ideographic; the latter one as nomothetic. But ideographic approaches in
terms of single case studies in and of themselves need not be informative about particular
individuals’ specificity because they fail to disentangle individual-specific from group-,
population-, or species-specific patterns (Uher, An integrative meta-theoretical frame-
work for research on individual behaviour in context—situations, populations, species,
unpublished). Single case studies are informative about individual-specificity only if they
are based on the meta-theoretical assumption that individuals generally differ from one
another in a given population. This is commonly assumed for humans, but not necessarily
for individuals of other species. Single case studies of, for example, cockroaches can also
be based on the assumption that all individuals are alike. Thus, studying one individual is
assumed to provide information about all individuals, but not necessarily about the
peculiarities of a particular one. Ideographic approaches are therefore informative about
individual-specificity only if they are conceptualised as ideographic-nomothetic
approaches such as in the above-introduced concept of individual-specificity that is based
on differential patterns in time-relative probabilities that are stable in meaningful ways.
Up to this point in the article, psychological and behavioural phenomena have
been discussed only exemplarily to illustrate the meta-theoretical analyses of
individual-specificity in fluctuating phenomena. I will now scrutinise the particular
kinds of phenomena in which individual-specific patterns are constructed as person-
ality. According to the lexical hypothesis, the lexically encoded representations of
individual-specificity refer to phenomena that are (1) perceivable and salient and (2)
important in everyday life, in particular in social encounters (John et al. 1988).
Systematic explorations of the kinds of phenomena to which these criteria apply
encounter two fundamental challenges.
Fundamental Challenges
With regard to phenomena that people perceive and construct as personality, one must
consider that individual-specific patterns cannot be directly perceived at any given
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moment in any given individual because they refer to probabilistic, differential, and
temporal patterns. This has far-reaching implications for their investigation in partic-
ular in phenomena as dynamic and fluctuating as those of the psyche and of
behaviour (discussed in detail below; Michell 1997, 1999; Rosenbaum and Valsiner
2011; Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in quanti-
fications of behaviour and personality, unpublished).
With regard to people’s constructs and representations of these phenomena, one
must consider that the construing activity of the human mind leads people to overlook
and to transcend gaps in perception (Brunswik 1952; Daston and Galison 2007;
Valsiner 2012). These are challenges for scientific psychologist as well. In contrast
to scientists in many other disciplines, personality psychologists study phenomena
that are important in everyday life—including their own—in individuals of their own
kind. They start researching these phenomena and such individuals only after having
acquired a substantial everyday psychological knowledge base and a pertinent lexical
repertoire in their pre-academic lives (Uher 2011a). Their everyday psychological
knowledge and the sociocultural context in which it is embedded may inevitably
influence and “confuse” their thinking as researchers (James 1893, p. 196; Weber
1949, p. 54)—despite all scholarly efforts (Jovchelovitch 2007; Komatsu 2012;
Valsiner 2012).
These challenges, which will be further explored below, require precise specifica-
tion and clarification of the central statements of the lexical hypothesis. To identify
individual-specificity, (1) people must be able to directly perceive the phenomena in
question in individuals. Only then can they consider the occurrences of their events
and compare these between individuals to identify differential patterns in time-
relative probabilities; and only then can they consider temporal patterns therein—
the three meta-theoretical criteria of individual-specificity in fluctuating and dynamic
phenomena (Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in
quantifications of behaviour and personality, unpublished). This is also implied by the
assumption that it is salient phenomena that become lexically encoded over time—
salience presupposes direct perceivability. The notion of perceiving does not imply
intention, purpose, or conscious awareness—in contrast to observing. (2) Directly
perceivable phenomena can become socially relevant and important in everyday life
only if these phenomena are also directly involved in the individuals’ interactions
with and in their relations to their—in particular social—environment. If particular
phenomena cannot directly interact with an individual’s environment but depend
completely on mediation through other phenomena, then these former phenomena
in and of themselves cannot become socially relevant and important in everyday life
without the phenomena that mediate them. Thus, they are secondary. For example, by
itself, a private thought cannot become effective in an individual’s life unless the
individual eventually externalises it in language or acts upon it (Uher, What is
behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, un-
published). This issue will be discussed in detail below.
Scrutinising Phenomena
To which kinds of phenomena do these two criteria—(1) direct perceivability and (2)
direct involvement in the individual’s environmental relations—apply? The lexical
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hypothesis specifies no particular kinds of phenomena, but the above-mentioned
psychological personality definitions do.
Psycho-Physiological Phenomena Some definitions specify psycho-physiological
phenomena. Individuals cannot directly perceive any of these phenomena, however,
either in themselves or in any other individual (criterion 1 failed). Moreover, psycho-
physiological phenomena may be involved only indirectly in the individuals’ rela-
tions to their environment and depend on mediation by other phenomena, such as of
physiology (e.g., metabolic) and of behaviour (criterion 2 partly failed; see Fig. 1).
Psychological Phenomena Psychological phenomena, such as those described as
emotions, thoughts, motives, beliefs, attitudes, and many others are essential elements
of many psychological personality definitions. But all these phenomena are entirely
internal (Toomela 2008). They cannot directly interact with any of the individual’s
external systems (Bronfenbrenner 1979). Hence, by themselves, psychological phe-
nomena cannot be directly involved in the individuals’ environmental relations
(criterion 2 failed). And because they are entirely internal, people can perceive them
Fig. 1 Behaviour—The essential bridge from the psyche to the environment. Note. The box in the dark
frame on the left side of the figure and the two smaller boxes that mirror its shape and composition on the
right side symbolise individuals. The arrows indicate the directions of the interactions that are possible
between the different types of phenomena considered; in the smaller symbols, only some of them are
depicted. Of the kinds of phenomena frequently mentioned in personality definitions, phenomena of
behaviour and of outer appearance are the only ones that fulfil both criteria implied by the lexical
hypothesis—i.e., (criterion 1) they are directly perceivable by individuals in themselves and in other
individuals, and (criterion 2) they can be directly involved in the individuals’ interactions with and their
relations to the environment. Behaviour is the essential interface between an individual’s psychological
phenomena, which are entirely internal, and that individual’s (abiotic and biotic, especially social)
environment. Those environmental details that functionally mediate the individual’s externalisations in
the present (i.e., the individual’s behaviour) are called the environmental situation (indicated with a dotted
line). In the graphic, the lower of the two individuals (indicated as small boxes) is part of the environmental
situation of the individual on the left side (indicated as large box), whereas the upper one is not
12 Integr Psych Behav (2013) 47:1–55
only in themselves through introspection (Wundt 1904), but they are unable to
perceive psychological events in any other individual (Locke 1689; Toomela 2008,
2011; criterion 1 semi-fulfilled). The psychological events of others can be inferred
only from events of external—and thus directly perceivable—phenomena that may
mediate between their internal and external systems, such as from behavioural
phenomena (see Fig. 1), including parts of language (Uher, What is behaviour?
And (when) is language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, unpublished).
Difficulties arise, however, because these mediating phenomena may not reflect
psychological phenomena unequivocally or accurately. Similar behavioural phenom-
ena can be related to different psychological phenomena and different behavioural
phenomena to similar psychological phenomena (Cervone et al. 2001; Kagan 1994,
1998; Lewin 1935; Mischel and Shoda 1994). Clear meta-theoretical differentiations
between behavioural and psychological phenomena are therefore essential (see
above). Moreover, differences in behavioural structures may be but are not neces-
sarily associated with differences in psychological structures (Toomela 2011). Further
complicating the matter is the fact that individuals must adapt their mediating
behaviours to the (subjectively interpreted; Rotter 1954) realities of the physical
and social environment—“acting is not the same as thinking” (Lahlou 2008, p. 21,
translated). This means that individuals can (and must) control the mediators to some
extent depending on the given contexts. This substantially complicates the ability to
make inferences to underlying psychological events. The reduced ability shown by
babies and young children to control behaviour may result in stronger relations
between the events of their psychological phenomena and those of their behavioural
phenomena. Yet their inability to provide self-reports hinders our ability to “validate”
any inferences that we make to their underlying psychological events.
But self-reports cannot be used for straightforward inferences either, not even in
adults, given how people acquire their semiotic repertoire for describing psycholog-
ical phenomena during childhood. Children learn the shared meaning of symbols only
because adults infer psychological phenomena from the children’s behaviours and
because they label these inferences with particular symbols that they had learned in
the same way. But because they cannot perceive the children’s psychological phe-
nomena directly, they may vary—and also err—in their interpretations. Not everyone
is “good at understanding” children; that is, at making inferences to their psycholog-
ical events with relatively high validity.
The horizon of one’s own realm of experiences plays an important role as well. Some
individuals experience psychological phenomena that others obviously never experience
or do not experience in the same way—as reflected in the very assumption of individual
differences. How can individuals understand what these symbols that denote particular
psychological phenomena refer to if they have never experienced such phenomena
themselves? How can colour-blind people understand the actual visual experience of
people who are able to perceive particular wavelengths of light (Ludlow et al. 2004)?
Locke (1689) ascertained that individual differences in the physical properties of sensory
organs should produce different perceptions and thus different ideas in different individ-
uals. But this could never be detected because nobody can pass into another individuals’
body to perceive the perceptions that those organs produce. It seems inevitable that—
even within semiotic communities—individuals develop slightly different personal con-
notations for socially shared symbols denoting particular psychological phenomena (cf.
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Westen 1996). Consequently, it can never be ascertained whether particular behaviours or
particular symbols of shared meaning refer, in fact, to exactly the same psychological
phenomena in different individuals. Their presence and quality in others cannot be
detected with absolute certainty because every individual can directly access only his
or her own psychological phenomena and cannot access anyone else’s (Locke 1689).
Behavioural Phenomena Behavioural phenomena, by contrast, are directly perceiv-
able by individuals both in themselves and in other individuals (criterion 1 fulfilled);
however, this perception need not be conscious (see notion of perceiving above). As
external activities or externalisations that are functionally mediated by the present
environment, behavioural phenomena are defined by being directly involved in the
individuals’ interactions with and in their relations to their environment (criterion 2
fulfilled).
Consequently, among those kinds of phenomena that are frequently incorporated
in contemporary personality definitions, behaviour is the only one that fulfils both
criteria implied by the lexical hypothesis. For this reason, personality is also con-
ceptualised as “dimensions of behavioural space” (Cattell 1950, p. 221), “individual
differences and profiles in behaviour and behavioural performances” (Pawlik 2006, p.
16, translated), and as individual-specific behavioural phenotypes (Uher 2011a).
Phenomena of Outer Appearance Other phenomena of ecto-phenotype fulfil these
criteria. Individuals can directly perceive individual-specific patterns in natural outer
appearance, such as body size and build, physiognomy, hair, or smell both in
themselves and in others (criterion 1 fulfilled). These phenomena can also be directly
involved in the individuals’ relations to their—in particular social—environment
(criterion 2 fulfilled). Artificial modifications that individuals often add to their
natural outer appearance to stress their individuality and that are socioculturally
considered “adornments” such as clothing, colour, hair style, jewellery, and fragran-
ces, are also—and actually purposefully made to be—(1) directly perceivable by
other individuals. They can also be (2) directly involved in the individuals’ environ-
mental interactions, their social interactions in particular, for example, as means of
social communication (“fine feathers make fine birds”) or by influencing how
individuals are socially perceived in terms of their “social stimulus value” (Allport
and Odbert 1936; Cattell 1950). Hence, ecto-phenotypical phenomena other than
behaviour can also become socially relevant in everyday life.
In summary, the meta-theoretical assumptions of the hypothesis that humans have
lexically encoded all individual differences in phenomena that are (1) directly perceiv-
able and (2) socially relevant and important in everyday life, and thus directly involved
in their environmental interactions, apply only to phenomena of behaviour and outer
appearance. But they do not apply to physiological and psychological phenomena.
This highlights two central points in which contemporary personality psychology
deviates from the meta-theoretical assumptions of the lexical hypothesis. First, outer
appearance is commonly not considered in scientific personality concepts. This is
surprising because—as to be expected from the lexical hypothesis—such individual
differences are encoded in everyday language. When Allport and Odbert (1936)
compiled lexical personality descriptors from Webster’s New International
Dictionary of the English Language (1925) for first comprehensive lexical studies,
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they also found terms describing physical appearance. Norman (1967) counted 882
such terms in a later edition of that dictionary. According to the lexical hypothesis,
“these characteristics should be included in an exhaustive specification of personal-
ity” (John et al. 1988, p. 186), but descriptors of outer appearance are typically
excluded from lexical personality research (Saucier and Goldberg 1998).
Interestingly, some early personality theorists explicitly considered outer appear-
ance in their definitions of personality. Guilford (1959, p. 7) conceived morphology
as one of seven “modalities of traits representing different aspects of personality”.
Eysenck (1947, p. 25) conceived constitution (the somatic sector) as one of four main
sectors of personality. Outer appearance is also central to constitutional theories of
personality (regardless of their methodological insufficiencies), such as those focus-
ing on body build (Kretschmer 1977; Sheldon and Stevens 1942), skull shape
(phrenology; Bouts 1931), and physiognomy (physiognomics; Aristotle, 300 BC,
1963; Lavater 1775–1778). Outer appearance is also increasingly considered in
research on person-perception at zero-acquaintance (Borkenau and Liebler 1992;
Hartung and Renner 2011), yet in relation to and not as part of personality.
A second point in which contemporary psychology deviates from the meta-
theoretical assumptions of the lexical hypothesis is that psycho-physiological and
psychological phenomena are frequently incorporated in personality concepts al-
though they do not fulfil the two criteria. Psycho-physiological phenomena (cf.
Allport 1937) are not perceivable by individuals in themselves or in others nor are
they well represented in the everyday lexica. Psychological phenomena are
prominently conceived as (the) core elements of personality both in scientific
psychology (Matthews et al. 2003) and in everyday psychology. In fact, the human
lexica contain many terms that are (also) used to describe individual-specific patterns
in psychological phenomena (e.g., anxious, playful). Granted the lexical hypothesis is
valid, so how can this be?
Genesis of Personal Constructs of Self- and Other-Perception
According to the lens model of human perception (Brunswik 1952, 1955), in a given
moment, individuals can perceive from their complex environment only details
although they have flexibility regarding which particular details they focus on.
Brunswik (1952, p. 23) therefore considered the human perceptual systems to be
“imperfect machines” that allow for the creation of only imperfect mental represen-
tations. Representational accuracy depends on the ecological validity with which
individuals can perceive their environment by shifting the narrow lens filters of their
perceptual systems. The accuracy of representations of highly dynamic and fluctuat-
ing phenomena, such as behaviour, may be particularly impaired.
However, developing perceptual constructs involves more than merely represent-
ing sketchy inputs as modelled in artificial neuronal networks. These networks
passively map any input they are receptive to. But perceptual constructs are not
imprints that external phenomena breaking through the individuals’ perceptual lenses
leave on their inner mental images as light breaking through an optical lens darkens
photobase paper. Representations are not copies (Jovchelovitch 2007). Mental repre-
sentations shape and sharpen the individuals’ perceptual lens filters, thus changing
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their perception (Fig. 1). Moreover, individuals can also perceive actively. They can
focus their perceptual lenses purposefully on particular details that could be mean-
ingful and that they therefore seek to perceive (Brunswik 1952). Particularly mean-
ingful in complex environments are recurrent patterns because their recognition and
mental representation may provide orientation and predictive control of future events
(Kelly 1955). This may lead individuals to selectively perceive and actively construct
more patterns than there actually are in the perceivable phenomena. Similarly, they
may seek to primarily perceive those structures and phenomena that match the mental
representations that they have already established (e.g., their category systems);
whereas they may give less consideration to those that do not match (i.e., thus
perceiving “through coloured glasses”). These processes of perception and mental
representation are iterative and self-reinforcing.
Essential for individuals are perceptions and constructs of patterns in their expe-
riences with their own person and their own relations to the environment (Kelly
1955). Because individuals can directly perceive psychological phenomena in them-
selves, they may recognise relations between patterns of their own psychological
experiences, patterns of their own behaviours, and patterns of their environment. It
may be for this reason that such relations are essential parts of personal constructs.
However, phenomena of both the psyche and behaviour are fluctuating and highly
dynamic as are many phenomena in the environment, the social environment in
particular (Brunswik 1955). The details that individuals can perceive from these
phenomena through shifting their perceptual lenses are necessarily inconsistent and
fragmentary (Brunswik 1952). Construing coherent and meaningful patterns in these
phenomena and in their interrelations must transcend these perceptual gaps.
The Mind-Environment Connection and the Essential Role of Behaviour
The most fundamental gap is that between the phenomena of the psyche and those of
the environment. This gap is particularly puzzling and difficult to understand because
it occurs in just one direction. Environmental phenomena may directly influence
psychological phenomena through perception. But there is no direct connection in
the other direction (Fig. 1). As entirely internal phenomena, psychological phenomena
may be able to directly influence other internal phenomena. For example, they may
influence physiological phenomena such as in psycho-neuro-endocrinological sys-
tems, but they cannot directly influence any phenomenon in the individual’s environ-
mental systems (Bronfenbrenner 1979). No thought and no motivation can move an
object in physical space. No emotion can directly influence another individual. This is
only possible for phenomena that are externalised or external—such as the ecto-
phenotypical phenomena of behaviour (including some parts of language; Uher,
What is behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition,
unpublished) and of outer appearance. Thoughts, motives, emotions, abilities, and all
other psychological phenomena can become effective in an individual’s environment
and in that individual’s environmental relations only if these phenomena can somehow
reach the external world through mediation of other phenomena at least at some point.
Behavioural phenomena are particularly suited for this mediation because their
dynamics and flexibility may be somewhat comparable to those of the psyche. This
enables timely mediation to the external world. This nearness-in-time is particularly
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important for the individual’s adaptation to and his or her interaction with dynamic
and flexibly changing environments, especially in the social domain. Phenomena of
outer appearance are comparably less flexible and more static, especially natural outer
appearance. Artificial modifications may be more flexible—but they are ultimately
results of behaviour. Psychological phenomena cannot directly influence outer ap-
pearance; even laughter and worry lines in the face are results of behaviour.
Consequently, behaviour is the essential interface between the individual’s internal
(biological and psychological) and external (abiotic and biotic, in particular social)
systems. It serves as the vital—and for psychological phenomena, the only—bridge
between the individual’s internal and external worlds (Fig. 1).
No individuals demonstrate the essential nature of this vital bridge and the one-
sidedness of the mind-environment connection more dramatically than those suffer-
ing from locked-in syndrome. Individuals in this condition are patients who are
awake and conscious, but who have no means of producing speech, limb, or facial
movements because their voluntary control over muscles is (sometimes completely)
paralysed (Laureys et al. 2005). This loss of motor control burns the sole bridge
between their psyche and the external world. They can still perceive their environ-
ment with (almost) all of their senses and continue to construct it in their minds
(Laureys et al. 2005). But they cannot behave and thus transmit information from
their internal worlds to the external world anymore. Experiencing the mind-
environment connection in its full-blown one-sidedness may perhaps cause their
greatest suffering. Locked-in syndrome can be recognised and differentiated from
vegetative states only in those patients who are still able to perform minimal
behaviours, be it sniffs or eye blinks. Such behaviours, as minuscule as they may
be, are mediating channels that enable patients to externalise information from their
inner psychological world. This mediation can be successful, however, only if the
social environment interprets these externalisations correctly—and if it still tries at all
to infer psychological phenomena in seemingly nonbehaving individuals.
The one-sidedness of this connection seems so puzzling and incompatible with the
logic of the human mind and, at the same time, behaviour fulfils its mediating function
so promptly and so smoothly, that individuals fill this gap (often not knowingly) with
assumptions of direct mutual connectedness. When individuals recognise recurrent
patterns in their own psyche and in their environment, they frequently construct direct
mutual connections and causal associations—seldomly becoming aware of the impos-
sibility of such. Personal constructs of self-perception therefore regularly contain
assumptions about direct mutual connectedness and causal relations. These constructs
constitute oversimplified representations that are parsimonious and often sufficiently
viable in everyday life and that can provide some orientation and predictability in
complex and uncertain environments (Kelly 1955). The iterative and self-reinforcing
processes of perception and of mental construction contribute to the maintenance of
these erroneous assumptions and make the one-sidedness of the mind-environment
connection for individuals increasingly harder to recognise.
Preconditions for Identifying Individual-Specific Patterns
Predictability is particularly important in the social environment. Therefore, individ-
uals seek to perceive and construct patterns that recur in many individuals—that is in
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the average individual—of their social environment. Of particular importance are the
environmental interactions of the average individual—that is normative patterns of
behaviour and outer appearance. Individuals also seek to recognise patterns that recur
in particular individuals and their environmental interactions—that is in individual-
specific patterns of behaviour and outer appearance. They construct these individual-
specific patterns of environmental interactions as personality (see above; cf. lexical
hypothesis; Allport 1937; Gray 1999, p. 563).
But how can individual-specific patterns be constructed at all? In fluctuating
phenomena, individual-specificity refers to differential patterns in time-relative prob-
abilities that are meaningfully stable over time (see above). As such, they cannot be
perceived at any given moment. “There is no present for all the elements and
structures of conceptual systems at once” (Althusser and Balibar 1970, p. 318).
Whereas behaviour is defined by its functional reference to the present (Uher, What
is behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition,
unpublished), constructs of personality—because they refer to time-relative probabi-
listic patterns that are stable across time—also involve phenomena of the past that
have already ceased to be. Therefore, the only way in which individuals can capture
personality is to—literally—(re)construct someone’s personality based on individual-
specific patterns that they can (re)cognise in past perceptions of past phenomena of
behaviour and outer appearance.
However, the past and the future are not realities. They are constructions of the
human mind. The ancient philosopher Augustine (354–430 AD, 1961) considered
linear time perception an achievement of the human mind and its “enduring attention”
(Hausheer 1937). Hence, constructs of personality, because they describe patterns
over time, require conscious awareness and time perception. Only those phenomena
that people can become consciously aware of are able to become the subject matter of
their personal constructs. And only those constructs that they are consciously aware
of can be socially shared and lexically encoded. However, people cannot consciously
perceive all behavioural phenomena that are important and socially relevant in every-
day life (Westen 1996). Pheromones (Grammer et al. 2005) and subliminal odours (Li
et al. 2007) influence human behaviour, in particular mate selection (Bhutta 2007), but
they are not consciously perceivable. Such phenomena are blind spots that likely
evade personal and social constructions of personality (Kagan 1998; Uher,
Methodological approaches to personality taxonomies: The Behavioural Repertoire x
Environmental Situations Approach—A non-lexical alternative, unpublished).
Recognising temporal patterns requires time perception. Individuals who are
unable to perceive time, and thus temporal patterns, cannot (re)cognise individual-
specific patterns—and thus cannot (re)construct personality. Babies seem to have no
sense of time at all; it develops only slowly during childhood (Fraisse 1964; Piaget
1969). This may hinder young children even after language acquisition from provid-
ing reliable reports about their own habitual behaviours or those of others. In adults,
subjective time perception generally accelerates with age and differs among individ-
uals (Carrasco et al. 2001; Joubert 1984). It is also flexible within individuals in that,
sometimes, time seems to fly or to drag slowly. Individuals may therefore have
different perceptions of temporal patterns of individual behaviour and also of (espe-
cially artificially modified) outer appearance—and thus vary in how they construct
personality differences.
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Of the sketchy details that individuals can perceive through their shifting percep-
tual lenses (Brunswik 1952), many may enter their minds just briefly. Those that are
memorised are not stored as the “pure” perceptions that they were when they entered
the person’s mind. Instead, perceptions are transformed into, organised with, and
integrated with information that is already stored—in constructs and representations
that thereby become continuously modified (Kelly 1955). “Experiences are cognitive
resultants of past lives” in categorised form (Peirce 1902, CP 2.84). Thinking is
making categories that link the experiences of the present moment with those of the
semiotically reconstructed past; the construction of the new is bound to and con-
strained by the reconstructions of the past (Valsiner 2012).
Consequently, individuals do not and cannot access large accumulations of “pure”
perceptions of past events. They cannot base the recognition of individual-specific
patterns in unbiased ways on large mental “data bases” of perceptions. Processing
such enormous masses of information to identify probabilistic, differential, and
temporal patterns would perhaps even exceed their cognitive capacities. All the more
given that the identification of such patterns is substantially hindered by the fact that,
in behavioural and psychological phenomena, within-individual variation often con-
siderably exceeds between-individual variation (Shweder and Sullivan 1990; Mischel
1968; Uher, An integrative meta-theoretical framework for research on individual
behaviour in context—situations, populations, species, unpublished). Instead, indi-
viduals can access only information that they have already integrated, transformed,
and (re)constructed in iterative processes of perception and construction over time.
“Recognition is not a simple accumulation of elements, but an integrated whole”
(Komatsu 2012 online, p. 3).
For these reasons, the particular phenomena of behaviour and outer appearance
and the particular situations in which they are perceived along with the particular
individuals, the particular occasions and the particular spans of time that people
actually consider when they mentally (re)construct individual-specificity (i.e., per-
sonality; Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in
quantifications of behaviour and personality, unpublished) all remain unknown—also
to the construers themselves. These mental (re)constructions necessarily suffer from
constraints, biases, and errors in perception, memory, and reasoning (Fahrenberg et
al. 2007; Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Shweder and D'Andrade 1980).
Genesis of Socially Shared Constructs of Self- and Other-Perception
The effective ability to communicate with others substantially increases the informa-
tion that individuals can obtain. Communication (verbal and nonverbal) may direct an
individual to focus its perceptual lens on particular details that others have perceived
and that they consider important, thereby promoting the socially shared perception of
particular phenomena and thus their salience. Verbal communication enables indi-
viduals to exchange information also beyond what is available in the present (Uher,
What is behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition,
unpublished). This opens up further avenues to obtain information that is relevant for
(re)cognising individual-specific patterns and that may, at the same time, modify the
individual’s pertinent constructs and representations. Sharing information about
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individuals is obviously so important to human social life that gossiping about who-
is-doing-what-with-whom comprises up to about two thirds of conversation time
(Dunbar 1996) and occurs in all human cultures (Brown 1991). Central to this gossip
is information about average individuals and about particular individuals in the
social environment. Obtaining this information inevitably entails comparisons among
individuals.
Possibilities for Identifying Individual-Specific Patterns
The rather static phenomena of outer appearance can be perceived in many individ-
uals at the same time and can therefore be compared rather directly between individ-
uals. By contrast, the dynamic and fluctuating nature of behavioural phenomena
hinders their simultaneous perception in many individuals—and hence hinders direct
comparisons between individuals. Only in particular situations, such as in footraces in
which individuals perform exactly the same behaviour spatially and temporally in
parallel to one another, do differences between individuals become directly perceiv-
able. But such situations and uniform performances of the same behaviours in spatial
and temporal parallelism are not typical of everyday life.
Psychological phenomena, in turn, can generally not be directly perceived in other
individuals (Locke 1689; Toomela 2008)—hence, they cannot be directly compared
between individuals. This is a crucial point for psychology, especially for personality
psychology. Ultimately, how could people identify differences between individuals in
phenomena that everyone can directly perceive in just one single individual—in just
oneself? The impossibility of perceiving psychological phenomena in others (Locke
1689) also entails that the validity of inferences from others’ externalisations, such as
from their behaviour (nonverbal and verbal; cf. Uher, What is behaviour? And (when)
is language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, unpublished), can never be
exactly ascertained (cf. Toomela 2011). Any comparisons based on phenomena that
potentially mediate the mind-environment connection are necessarily compromised.
They are but social conventions (Valsiner 2012). Even if each individual developed
his or her own private metric against which that person could quantify his or her own
psychological phenomena—there would be no point of direct comparison by which
to convert these metrics across individuals.
But people cannot directly compare their own psychological phenomena even
within themselves across time. Psychological phenomena are “of maximum unique-
ness—they occur each only once, at the minuscule border of the future and the past
we construct as the ‘present’” (Valsiner 1998, 2012, p. ix). They are “actualities”
(Gillespie and Zittaun 2010, p. 72). Their perception is inevitably bound to the
present, which is described as the “here and now” in the field of psychology. (For
considerations of the present and its perception, see James 1893, and Le Poidevin
2004, 2011). Comparisons of perceptions of psychological phenomena within the
individual would require comparisons with past ones—which, however, have already
ceased to be. All that can remain are memorised perceptions (Le Poidevin 2011) that
have already been integrated, organised, abstracted, and (re)constructed—the “cog-
nitive resultants of past lives” (Peirce 1902, CP 2.84; Valsiner 2012). Consequently,
perceptions of ongoing psychological phenomena can be compared only with
(re)constructions of past perceptions. Direct comparison between present and past
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events of psychological phenomena—and thus quantifications of them—are impos-
sible. Attributions of quantitative properties to psychological phenomena therefore
must be—and are—fundamentally challenged (e.g., Brower 1949; Michell 1997;
2003; Omi 2012; Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011).
The actively construing minds of individuals again transcend these impossibilities—
largely unnoticed as they transcend the one-sided gap of the mind-environment con-
nection. Because each individual can directly perceive his or her own psychological
phenomena, and constructs relations among them and to his or her own behavioural
phenomena, social exchange may promote the assumption that other individuals have
similar experiences and constructions as well. Likewise, social exchangemay contribute
to the awareness that others also experience perceptual gaps. Vice versa, realising the
existence of perceptual gaps and the resultant lack of understanding may trigger social
exchange and the formation of socially shared constructs (Moscovici 1961; Voelklein
and Howarth 2005). These processes may explain why the entirely internal phenomena
of the psyche are commonly incorporated into socially shared constructs of personality.
These constructs are, in the strictest sense, socially shared constructs of self-perception,
but not of other-perception. The latter is possible only for the phenomena of behaviour
and outer appearance.
Through social exchange, individuals can also incorporate into their own personal
or subjective constructs those that other individuals have subjectively constructed;
thereby merging and shaping them in socially shared ways into intersubjective or
social representations (Jovchelovitch 2007) or folk concepts (Tellegen 1993).
Because everyone constructs the world differently (Kelly 1955), inferring psycho-
logical phenomena from the externalisations of other individuals and comparing the
inferred phenomena across individuals and with those of one’s own psyche is
necessarily a collective act. Compromises are required in order to achieve consensus
on the particular inferences drawn and on the particular comparisons made. This may
lead to different outcomes in different sociocultural communities as the diversity of,
for example, parental ethnotheories shows (Pillai 2012). But social exchange and
intersubjective compromise need not necessarily resolve contradictions between
personal and socially shared constructs. Individuals and semiotic communities can
simultaneously maintain competing constructs in terms of cognitive polyphasia
(Howarth et al. 2004; Moscovici 1961).
Semiotic systems are elementary for social exchange—lexical symbols in partic-
ular. They are essential for making subjectively constructed meanings accessible to
others and for intersubjectively exchanging them among construing minds. However,
“language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself
the shaper of ideas” (Whorf 1958, p. 5). The very communication tools that people
use to build up and to express their representations already implicitly contain some
structures (Lahlou 1996). Language mediates thoughts and enables abstract thinking
(Neuman et al. 2012).
A crucial process through which language enables abstraction is hypostatic
abstraction in which perceivable qualities (e.g., sweet) are converted into objects
(e.g., sweetness; Peirce 1902, CP 4.227). This reification makes perceivable qual-
ities functionally independent of their embodied experience. As objects, these
qualities can be associated with signs that are arbitrarily related. These reified
qualities can become objects of reflection and contemplation and can be linked to
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various other modes of perception and to connotations (Neuman et al. 2012).
Languages therefore contain not only concrete words that refer to directly perceiv-
able phenomena; they also contain abstract words that refer to ideas and concepts
that are distant from immediate perception (Vygotsky 1962). Because the concrete
references of abstract words cannot be easily traced anymore, these words are
loaded with meanings that likely vary across sociocultural and historical contexts
(Neuman et al. 2012). Hence, all words have meaning; the meaning of every word is
a construct (Vygotsky 1962).
Contextuality of Constructs of Self- and Other-Perception
Constructs reflect recurring patterns that have been perceived in the world (Kelly
1955). As such, they represent knowledge. Constructs of self- and other-perception
represent knowledge about individuals—average and particular ones—and thus about
comparisons between them (see above; Westen 1996).
Knowledge is always context-dependent (Jovchelovitch 2007). The knowledge
that constructs of self- and other-perception reflect may depend on the context of
particular individuals. It can therefore be ideographic and personalistic (Allport
1937; Kelly 1955; Lamiell 2003; Murray 1938; Stern 1935). It also depends on the
individuals’ stages of development (Toomela 2010a), on their knowledge and educa-
tional level (Vygotsky 1962), and on their abilities to reflect about themselves, their
world (Omi 2012), and their life histories (McAdams 1985). Different individuals
therefore associate standardised items on personality questionnaires with different
“fields of meaning” that need not be identical to the interpretations that the research-
ers have of these items (Arro 2012; Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011, p. 47). This
knowledge may also depend on the context of particular situations (Bandura 1986;
Lazarus 1981; Mischel 1968; Rotter 1954) and on the states of mind that individuals
may have in particular situations (Omi 2012), such as particular goals and motiva-
tions (Biesanz and Human 2010). It may also depend on the context of particular
groups of individuals; therefore, reference group effects can be found (Heine et al.
2002).
The knowledge that constructs of self- and other-perception reflect also depends on
the context of the particular semiotic system in which it is encoded. Bilingual people
therefore describe themselves differently depending on the language they use—even
in translated versions of the same questionnaire (Veltkamp et al. 2012). It is not
possible to separate a semiotic system from the sociocultural context in which it was
developed (Køppe 2012; Whorf 1958). The knowledge that constructs of person
perception reflect therefore also depends on the context of the particular culture in
which it was developed. Culture is “the inherent core of human psychological
functions” (Valsiner 2009, p. 5). The particular patterns and phenomena that particular
groups of individuals perceive as salient, that they construct as socially relevant, and
that they semiotically encode (cf. lexical hypothesis) is culture-dependent (Church
and Katigbak 1988, 1989). “Cultures select a limited range from among the spectrum
of [patterns] to encode in their lexicon, and they may select differently. Languages
differ not only in the precise … terms they include (as every translator knows), but
more broadly in the aspects … their vocabularies emphasize” (McCrae and Costa
1997, p. 510; Angleitner et al. 1990).
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Finally, person-related knowledge also depends on the context of the historical era
in which it is developed and encoded (Kagan 1998). The socio-cultural norms of
interpretation and appraisal of particular patterns of behaviours and of outer appear-
ances may change over time—and with it the pertinent everyday psychological
knowledge. Over time, new lexical symbols (John et al. 1988)—and new meanings
(Toomela 2010a; Vygotsky 1962)—are created, whereas others become outdated and
are no longer used.
The preceding analyses have shown that lexical approaches and assessment
methods investigate everyday psychological knowledge, but not the phenomena that
this knowledge is about. The philosophy-of-science perspective will now be used to
scrutinise the prevailing strategy to explain individual differences—explicitly or
implicitly—with assumptions of “traits”.
Strategies of Scientific Explanation Based on Trait Concepts
Over the last century, psychologists have tried to tackle the major task of systemat-
ically and comprehensively categorising individual differences in order to develop
explanatory theories of personality. “For, we can look at a theory of personality as a
specification of the most important individual differences and then as a model of how
they come about” (Goldberg 1981, p. 141). To do so, it was necessary to meet three
challenges.
The first challenge was to devise suitable strategies for deciding which kinds of
individual differences to select for empirical categorisations (Goldberg 1981; Uher
2008a, b, Uher, Methodological approaches to personality taxonomies: The
Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach—A non-lexical alter-
native, unpublished)—a task that seemed “hopelessly complex” (Thurstone 1934, p.
14). The lexical hypothesis suggested that categorising the collective knowledge
about individual differences that people had encoded in their natural languages could
be a suitable strategy for developing comprehensive taxonomic models of individual
differences. The compilations of lexical descriptors in comprehensive lexica—the
“storehouses of folk knowledge” (John et al. 1988, p. 174)—that were already
available for various languages made this a viable, though labour-intensive approach
(Allport and Odbert 1936; Norman 1967).
The second challenge was to devise methods of scientific measurement of indi-
vidual differences (Uher 2008a). The lexical hypothesis suggested that enquiring
about lay people’s constructs about individual differences could be a suitable scien-
tific method (Block 2010; Westen 1996). The ease of collecting such data from many
individuals made assessments by lay people the “preferred” (Matthews et al. 2003,
p. 5) “if not the standard” method (Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011, p. 50; italics added)
on which personality psychology “relied heavily” (Baumeister et al. 2007, p. 396).
The third challenge was to devise methods for the systematic reduction of the
complex data sets obtained through assessments, be they based on lexical or other
approaches (cf. Uher 2008a; Uher, Methodological approaches to personality taxon-
omies: The Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach—A non-
lexical alternative, unpublished). Many statistical methods have been developed to
identify the structures that underlie empirical data to enable parsimonious
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descriptions of their complex manifest structures (e.g., factor analyses; Thurstone
1934; Cattell 1952).
Statistics describe structures that are latent to data. Assessment data reflect how
much people believe (i.e., construct) that particular lexical descriptions apply to partic-
ular individuals. Lexical descriptions encode the socially shared knowledge about
individuals. This knowledge comprises everyday psychological descriptions of patterns
of behaviour and of outer appearance as well as potential causal explanations—be they
accurate or not—in terms of inferred psychological phenomena in particular.
Assessments rely on this knowledge. They also rely on the personal and socially shared
constructions about how to quantify—the not directly perceivable—individual-specific
patterns in these phenomena (see above). Consequently, the latent structures that can be
identified by lexical or other assessment studies reflect structures that underlie the
socioculturally shared construction, interpretation, appraisal, and explanation of con-
sciously perceived individual differences (Borkenau and Ostendorf 2008; John 1990).
These structures describe categorical systems of personality descriptions in natural-
language terms (Goldberg 1982; John and Srivastava 1999) and thus comprise models
of everyday beliefs about personality (Westen 1996)—i.e., the systems of collective
knowledge.
The prevailing psychological interpretation of the structures that are latent to
assessment data, however, is that they reflect stable structures that are latent to the
individual-specific phenomena that are being described and assessed. Hence, as an
analogy to statistical methods in which true (i.e., stable) structures are modelled as
latent “traits” that underlie complex empirical (observable) data and that can statis-
tically explain these data, these structures are assumed to reflect stable structures in
psychological, physiological, and other phenomena internal to the individual that
causally influence and can thus explain that individual’s (perceivable) behaviour.
These structures are called “traits” or “dispositions” in personality psychology
(Allport 1937; Matthews et al. 2003).
The statistical approximation of true scores that are free of measurement error
refers to precision in scientific measurement. Measuring personality “traits” that are
stable rather than that fluctuate across occasions and across situations, as is the case
for behaviour seems therefore intrinsically plausible and scientifically valuable. But
this reasoning is based on a fundamental fallacy entailed by the human language.
Language enables abstraction because it allows us to make perceivable qualities
independent from their immediate perception by reifying them into linguistic objects
(i.e., hypostatic abstraction, Peirce 1902, CP 4.227; see above; Neuman et al. 2012).
Reifications are prone to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness in which abstractions
are treated as concrete (Whitehead 1929). The idea of individual-specific patterns in
behavioural and other phenomena requires high levels of abstraction. The linguistic
reification of this complex and highly abstract idea through lexical encodings, such as
by the terms “traits” or “dispositions”, is therefore inherently prone to this fallacy. It
misleads people to treat “traits” and “dispositions” as concrete actual entities.
The reification of constructs of self- and other-perception as causal entities that
underlie the phenomena that are being perceived and constructed are widespread in
everyday psychology. For example, individuals who behave aggressively at some
point in time are ascribed as having aggressive “traits” or “dispositions”; and the
construction of them as having these “traits” is used to explain the fact that they
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behaved in this manner in a given moment. In everyday life, linguistic reification
facilitates and accelerates the exchange of information, despite its inexactitude. It may
therefore disseminate more quickly than more accurate yet cumbersome descriptions.
Everyday psychology is therefore full of reifications and circular explanations
(Laucken 1974).
The assumption of “traits” as heritable structures internal to the individual (Brody
1994) that “determine behaviour in a defined situation” (Cattell 1950, p. 222) ascribes
to these abstract ideas not only a concrete existence, but furthermore a causal status
(Bock 2000). But assessments of “traits” do not and cannot capture causal entities
inside the individuals assessed (Komatsu 2012). “Traits” are lexically encoded and
socially shared constructs about recurring patterns in phenomena perceivable in the
assessed individuals—i.e., in behaviours and in outer appearances. As such, “traits”
are categorical summary statements about a person’s behaviour (Wiggins 1979).
Using these summary statements to explain and predict behaviour means “in effect
using a description of behaviour to explain it” (Mischel and Shoda 1994, p. 157).
The circularity of psychological explanations that are based on trait concepts may
not be as directly apparent as that of the explanations that are provided by everyday
psychology. Scientific constructs of “personality traits” are the result of long and
highly complex series of abstraction processes. The phenomena to be explained are
first filtered through iterative and repeated processes of perception, personal and
socially shared (re)construction, lexical encoding, and assessment by lay psycholo-
gists (see above). The outcomes of these processes are then further condensed by the
application of complex statistical methods by scientific psychologists. The complex-
ity of these processes of abstraction, of which the everyday psychological ones are
still poorly understood (Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011), may mask the circularity of
these explanations—but cannot overcome it.
In a nutshell, psychological explanations based on trait concepts equate the statistical
structures underlying the assessments of encoded constructions about perceivable
phenomena with the phenomena that underlie these perceivable phenomena. This
explanation is circular at a very high level of abstraction and complexity, but it is
essentially circular. Figure 2 illustrates this schematically. Based on the erroneous
assumption that D is a measure of C, which underlies A, it is concluded that D measures
what underlies A and that it can thus causally explain A. But meta-theoretical analyses
show that D can only be the latent structure of B, which are the constructs and
representations that people develop of A. Explaining A with D is thus circular.
Given that assessments reflect socially shared knowledge about recurring patterns
in behaviour and outer appearance, it is not surprising—but rather to be expected—
that “personality predicts behaviour” (Paunonen and Ashton 2001) and that, vice
versa, individuals can use “thin slices of behaviour” (Borkenau et al. 2004), “min-
imal appearance cues”, such as “facial structures” (Kramer and Ward 2010) or shoes
(Gillath et al. 2012) to activate this knowledge and use it to “accurately assess
others’ personality” even at zero acquaintance (Shevlin et al. 2003). But such cues
are not “signals” of entities internal to individuals (Kramer and Ward 2010) that
people are able to decipher. These findings merely reflect the socially shared
knowledge about how particular individual-specific patterns in behaviour and outer
appearance typically go together in a particular semiotic community and how that
community (causally) explains this. This knowledge may also be reflected implicitly
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in lexical descriptors that do not refer explicitly to outer appearance (which were
excluded from lexical approaches). Likewise, it is also to be expected that personality
assessments are stable across decades (Conley 1984; Soldz and Vaillant 1999). This
stability is also a property of the socially shared knowledge they reflect.
At the bottom of psychological explanations based on trait concepts is the—anything
but new—insight that “past behaviour is the best predictor of future behaviour”. It may
be circular to predict behaviour with behaviour—and this is why assumptions of
independent internal entities are so tempting. But it is not circular to predict future
events from past events, in particular not in phenomena as dynamic and fluctuating and
inherently bound to the present, such as those of behaviour. In complex dynamic
environments, such as in the social world, identifying recurrent patterns in these
phenomena can provide orientation and predictive control. But prediction is not yet
an explanation. Past behaviour can be causally related to future behaviour, though
only indirectly, such as through the mediation of environmental (in particular
social) transactions or through the knowledge that people have developed about
it. But this cannot explain how behavioural patterns emerge in the first place.
The direct causes of behaviour, which are primarily sought in psychological,
biological, and other internal phenomena as well as in external environmental
conditions, cannot be captured through assessments and causal reifications of
behavioural descriptions. They can be explored—in themselves and as possible causes
of individual behaviour—only if they are studied in their own rights (see below).
Implications for Personality Psychology
The circularity of scientific explanation based on trait concepts derives from the
fundamental challenges that the different kinds of phenomena entail that are de-
scribed in the lexical hypothesis. Of the phenomena that people construct and
represent, many are bound to the present, such as those of behaviour and the psyche,
which makes direct perceptions of individual-specific patterns impossible. Their
(re)cognition requires repeated perception, memorisation, and mental reconstruction
(Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in quantifica-
tions of behaviour and personality, unpublished). But the dynamics and fluctuations
of these phenomena— and the individual’s narrow perceptual lens filters that shift
across these phenomena’s fluctuating events—enable only fragmentary and
Fig. 2 The fundamental circularity of psychological explanations based on trait concepts. Note. Based on
erroneous meta-theoretical assumptions about what phenomena are actually reflected by assessment data, D
is considered to be a measure of C, which are the phenomena that underlie A. Therefore, it is concluded that
D measures what underlies A and that D can thus causally explain A. But D can be the latent structure only
of the phenomena B, which are the constructs and representations that people develop of A. Thus,
explaining A with D is circular
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inconsistent perceptions (Brunswik 1952), which thus hinders the (re)cognition of
individual-specific patterns. Nonetheless, to enable orientation and sense of control,
human minds transcends these gaps (Daston and Galison 2007; Valsiner 2012) and
reify—promoted through language (Neuman et al. 2012)—mental (re)constructions
of the perceived into causal entities (Bock 2000; Lamiell 2003), thus blending a
phenomenon’s description with its explanation (Mischel and Shoda 1994). This
obscures the vital differentiation between the phenomena to be explained, the explan-
anda, from those explaining them, the explanantia (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948;
Popper 1934)—and inevitably entails explanatory circularity.
These are challenges to everyday psychologists (Laucken 1974) and scientific
psychologists alike. The latter are always both. “All scientists are victims of a
linguistic structure that partially controls our thinking” (Howard 1994, p. 400).
Underlying this structure are the basic assumptions that their particular semiotic
communities maintain about the “lived” relations between individuals and their
world—i.e., their ideologies (Althusser and Balibar 1970, p. 314). Ideology precedes
science; it “constitutes the prehistory of a science” (p. 45). By breaking radically with
the epistemological frame of reference of prescientific (i.e., ideological) notions and
by constructing new patterns through scientific methodology—i.e., through thinking
about phenomena and the means of producing knowledge [German: Wissen schaffen]
about them—science [German: Wissenschaft] is produced. But alongside science,
ideologies survive as essential elements of every social formation (Althusser and
Balibar 1970). Sciences are always embedded in the sociocultural ideologies that
operate through the meanings that semiotic communities attribute to their activities
through common sense (Valsiner 2012).
This may explain why scientific psychologists—at least in Western societies,
where basic assumptions of homo rationalis (Simon 1993) prevail—are so confident
about the abilities of everyday psychologists to comprehensively identify, accurately
describe, and validly quantify all individual differences that are socially relevant and
important in everyday life—as this is prominently reflected in the lexical hypothesis
and its fundamental significance as one of the most important—if not the most
important—guiding theoretical assumptions in modern personality psychology (cf.
Ashton and Lee 2005).
The Current State of Knowledge about the Lexical Hypothesis
Despite its enormous importance, the lexical hypothesis itself has not yet been made
an object of scientific inquiry. Still today, almost 130 years after its first articulation
(Galton 1884), it has remained but a hypothesis. To gain a more comprehensive
understanding of this hypothesis and its current state, it is important to explore its
possible origins.
The lexical hypothesis was not derived from a specific theory; rather, some
specific theories were developed based on parts of its basic statements and on the
results obtained from empirical applications of it (Goldberg 1981). Most likely, the
lexical hypothesis was generated by abduction—a form of logical inference that
Peirce (1901, CP 7.218) introduced as “guessing” and considered “merely prepara-
tory”. Abduction is an essential epistemological step in scientific reasoning. It begins
with surprising facts that are in need of an explanation that is not available at the
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outset. Consideration of the surprising facts suggests a hypothesis that, if it was true,
would explain the observed facts as a matter of course. The particular hypothesis is
suggested by the resemblance between the facts and the consequences of the hypoth-
esis if it is found to be true. “Hence, there is reason to suspect the generated
hypothesis is true” (Peirce 1903, CP 5.188-5.189). But its truth is still uncertain
because abduction seeks to explain facts ascertained in the present by inferring
possible causes of these facts, which necessarily lie in the past and thus have already
ceased to be (Valsiner 2012).
For Galton (1884), it may not have been a single surprising fact that led him to
abduce the lexical hypothesis, though the richness of lexical descriptors about
individuals could indeed surprise someone who is unfamiliar with human languages.
But rather, it may have been the reduction problem of a science that is concerned with
the surprising complexity of the real phenomena of individual differences. If the
lexical hypothesis was true, lexical descriptors of individual differences would be
self-evident consequences. Thus, some of its statements could provide an explanation
for the existence of the pertinent repertoires in everyday languages and—based on
this—a possible solution to the reduction problem of personality psychology.
Once hypotheses are generated abductively, they are used as general premises to
reach specific conclusions in scientific reasoning. Two approaches to argumentation
are thereby possible: deductive and inductive. If the truth of the general premise is
believed to definitely establish the truth of the conclusions, then the argument is
deductive. If the truth of the general premise is not assumed to definitely establish the
truth of the conclusions, but to provide good reasons to believe that they are true and
unlikely to be false, then the argument is inductive. Thus, deduction seeks a logically
certain conclusion that is derived from the premise, whereas induction seeks facts that
support or falsify the premise. But neither deduction nor induction can leave the
realm of analysis that the hypothetical premise defines and delimits. They cannot
create new knowledge. This is possible only for abduction because it “seeks a theory”
(Peirce 1901, CP 7.218). Hence, abduction creates new knowledge—yet at the
expense of a priori certainty about its truth. This uncertainty allows—and intrinsically
calls—for their constant reconsideration and reconstruction (Valsiner 2012; cf. also
Althusser and Balibar 1970; Weber 1949).
For the lexical hypothesis, this has not yet been done. Personality psychologists
took this hypothesis as a true premise by which to reach the specific conclusion that
the human lexical repertoires constitute finite sources of information for categorising
individual differences (Allport and Odbert 1936; Cattell 1943; Goldberg 1993; John
et al. 1988). But inductive investigations have not yet been done; personality psy-
chology did not—and still does not—seek facts that may support or falsify this
hypothesis. It is still unknown whether in fact all individual differences that are
important in interpersonal life are lexically encoded as stated by the lexical hypoth-
esis. For example, how well are individual differences in behaviours that are not
consciously perceivable yet are known to influence social behaviour (see above)
represented in everyday psychological knowledge? And how is this knowledge
lexically encoded? Where do the differences in taxonomic models come from that
have been derived from different languages? Do they reflect actual differences in the
individual-specific behaviours and outer appearances between different language
communities, just differences in what these communities consider salient and socially
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relevant or in how they interpret and appraise what they perceive, or all of these
together (see below)?
The status of the truth of the lexical hypothesis is still as uncertain as it was at the
time of its abduction almost 130 years ago (Galton 1884). Even worse, at this
historical point in time, personality psychology is de facto unable to test this
hypothesis empirically because its basic statements have been only partially consid-
ered so far. Psychologists have so far systematically categorised only people’s lexi-
cally encoded constructs and representations, but they have not even tried to achieve
this for those phenomena that are constructed and represented in everyday life—that
is, for individual-specific patterns in behaviour (Uher, Methodological approaches to
personality taxonomies: The Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations
Approach—A non-lexical alternative, unpublished) and in outer appearance.
Psychologists have revealed only half of the story of personality so far. However,
comprehensive categorisation systems of individual-specific behaviours and appear-
ances are needed to unravel how lexically derived models actually represent perceiv-
able individual differences; the ways in which they may reflect different perceptions,
interpretations, and appraisals; and how individual behaviours and outer appearances
actually vary within and among different sociocultural and language communities (cf.
Block 2010). This knowledge is also essential for systematic investigations of the
actual causal mechanisms behind many fascinating findings that have been found by
using lexically derived taxonomic models. Ten desiderata for future research are
specified below.
Lack of an Elaborated Philosophy of Science for Personality Psychology
As scientists concerned with phenomena that are important in each individual’s
everyday life, personality psychologists are particularly susceptible to the “psychol-
ogist’s fallacy” (James 1893, p. 196)—the unwanted confusion between our own
personal standpoints and the scientific objects we study. “It is true that in our
sciences, personal value-judgments have tended to influence scientific arguments
without being explicitly admitted” (Weber 1949, p. 54). “Psychology is a science
which is peculiarly liable to distortion by pseudo-scientific, political and religious
intrusions” (Cattell 1950, p. 11). Like all individuals, researchers have socioculturally
guided minds (Valsiner 1998). Ideologies about the relations of individuals—average
and particular ones—to their social world—i.e., about personality—are particularly
pronounced. The influences of such ideologies on the scientific practices in person-
ality research are therefore particularly profound and difficult to recognise and to
confine.
Scientific ideas should be separated from the sociocultural ideologies into which
they are embedded and that all individuals as members of their particular semiotic
communities have in their minds (Valsiner 1998). Unfortunately, an explicit and
elaborated philosophy-of-science framework that could help personality psycholo-
gists to continuously rethink and challenge their own ways of generating knowledge
has not yet been established—despite Rychlak’s (1968) promising start half a century
ago and apart from brief sections on ideographic and nomothetic approaches and
discussions of the “images of man” of major schools of thought contained in many
textbooks. But philosophy-of-science tools are essential for regularly rethinking and
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challenging the meta-theoretical structures that have became established in schools of
thought and in the scientific practices of a discipline (Kuhn 1976).
Nature is vastly too complex to be explored even approximately at random.
Something must tell the scientists where to look and what to look for, and that
something, though it may not last beyond his generation, is the paradigm with
which his education as a scientist has supplied him. Given that paradigm and
the requisite confidence in it, the scientists largely ceases to be an explorer at
all, or at least to be an explorer of the unknown. Instead, he struggles to
articulate and concretize the known. (Kuhn 1976, p. 61)
Paradigmatically fixed and no longer challenged assumptions close the doors to
intellectual innovation (Valsiner 2012). In personality psychology, the paradigmatic
establishment of trait concepts has hindered elaborations and explications of the
meta-theoretical assumptions that underlie this particular concept and the school of
thought in which it was developed, which has impeded the recognition of its
fundamental explanatory circularity. But meta-theoretical assumptions are always
effective in any scientific practice—even if they may be effective only implicitly.
The assumption that the “description of personality must precede, not follow, per-
sonality theory” (Costa and McCrae 1992, p. 861) overlooks the methodological
matter of fact that all empirical facts are defined as facts only based on particular
theoretical assumptions.
At the same time, the dogmatic and unquestioned status of assessments by
laypeople as the standard methods of “scientific measurement” has hindered the
explication of the meta-theoretical basis on which they rest. Selecting methods a
priori rather than purposefully for given questions narrows researchers’ perceptions
of real phenomena and blinds them to particular elements (Gillespie and Zittaun
2010; Omi 2012; Toomela 2011; Westen 1996). The tempting assumption that
assessments constitute a “direct approach to find out what people think or feel” by
using a “simple and straightforward task” (Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011, p. 50) that
requires only “abbreviated introspection” (p. 47) has blinded many psychologists to
the fact that the phenomena of the psyche and of behaviour are inherently bound to
the present (Gillespie and Zittaun 2010; Uher, What is behaviour? And (when) is
language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, unpublished; Valsiner 1998,
2012) and cannot be captured by retrospective assessments at all (Uher, Meta-
theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in quantifications of behav-
iour and personality, unpublished).
Their efficiency with regard to data collection in large samples in conjunction with
sophisticated statistical methods for data analysis has given assessment methods a
scientific shape that has consolidated their status as the standard empirical method
(Omi 2012; Sato et al. 2010; Toomela 2011; Westen 1996). But this a priori status has
precluded an enquiry as to what the phenomena actually are that are being converted
into data in assessments—and thus has precluded a rethinking of how these data can
be analysed and interpreted at all (Gillespie and Zittaun 2010; Køppe 2012; Toomela
2011; Valsiner 2012). This has hindered many from recognising that assessments can
reflect only knowledge structures, but not past events of psychological or behavioural
phenomena. It has also hindered the recognition that, in the fluctuations of behaviour,
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individual-specific patterns cannot be directly perceived and thus cannot be directly
quantified. The a priori status of these methods has also hindered the recognition that
psychological phenomena may not—and actually cannot—have quantitative proper-
ties that could be “measured psychometrically” because they, too, are phenomena that
are inherently bound to the present (Brower 1949; Michell 1997, 2003; Omi 2012;
Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011; Schwarz 2009; Trendler 2009; Valsiner 2012) and
that therefore, they cannot be compared with one another directly.
The lack of an elaborated meta-theory has also hindered many personality psy-
chologists from considering the fact that analyses of individual assessments on the
basis of their between-individual variation cannot yield results that are generalisable
to the understanding and explanation of within-individual variation—much less of
individual development or of the dynamics of internal mechanisms (Cervone et al.
2001; van Geert and van Dijk 2002; Omi 2012; Molenaar 2004a, b). The particular
numbers of dimensions of individual differences and their compositions are not
natural entities to be “discovered” anyway. They depend on the meta-theoretical
decisions made by scientists with regard to how real phenomena can be conceptually
reduced to scientific phenomena as well as their decisions about how the thus-derived
data can be reduced statistically (cf. Block 2010; Lamiell 2003). Statistics such as
factor analyses are not “de facto theories” (Gigerenzer 1991) or “mechanical truth
generators” (Meehl 1992, p. 152). Rather, they are but “mathematical thinking tools”
(Valsiner 2012, p. 201; Loftus 1996).
The focus of personality psychology on trait concepts, lexical encodings, and
assessment methods has hindered the ability of researchers to elaborate the meta-
theoretical assumptions on which the lexical hypothesis is based. Personality psy-
chologists have therefore failed to recognise that the hypothesis explicitly refers to
different sets of phenomena of which they have systematically explored only lexically
encoded representations so far, but have seriously neglected the phenomena that are
represented. Assumptions that “personality and its assessment are intimately bound
with natural language” (McCrae and Costa 1997, p. 510) and that “the idea of
personality traits may be as old as human language itself” (Matthews et al. 2003, p.
3) clearly refer to personality as the lexically encoded structures of everyday psy-
chological knowledge. But these structures cannot be understood and explained
without researching the phenomena that they are about.
The Dialectical Interplay Between Encodings, Constructs, and the Phenomena
Being Constructed
Individual-specific patterns of behaviour can also be found in babies and preverbal
children (e.g., Kagan et al. 1988) as well as in many other species (Allport 1937, p.
24). Among these species are those that are closely related to humans, such as
nonhuman primates (Uher et al., Contextualised behavioural measurements of per-
sonality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult
capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) unpublished), but also some that are related only
remotely, such as octopuses (Sinn and Moltschaniwskyj 2005). Hence, individual-
specific patterns in behaviour (and in outer appearance; Darwin 1859) are phyloge-
netically much older than the human semiotic systems that describe such patterns.
Ancestral humans initially developed lexical and other symbols to refer to something
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that they had perceived, (re)cognised, and mentally and socially constructed—and
that had thus already been there. Physiology, the psyche, and behaviour develop(ed)
before language—both in ontogeny and in phylogeny.
It would be fascinating and insightful to study individual human ancestors who
existed before humans had developed the faculty of language. Direct evidence of
when humans started to develop socially shared constructs of individual-specific
patterns of behaviour and outer appearance and pertinent semiotic symbols in
phylogenetic history is lacking. But indirect evidence comes from Palaeolithic dog
fossils that suggest that canine domestication had already begun at least some
30,000 years ago (Germonpré et al. 2009) and from an impressive 40-year breeding
experiment in another canine species. In farm foxes, strong selective breeding solely
for low fearfulness of and low aggressiveness to humans (i.e., tamability) over only
30–35 generations entailed a host of changes in genes, morphology, physiology, and
behaviour in which the present day’s domesticated species differ markedly from their
wild relatives. These findings suggest that individual-specific patterns in behaviour
rather than size or reproductive capacity have been the key factors of artificial
selections that humans have imposed on some species during domestication
(Belyaev 1969; Trut 1999). Hence, humans must have had been able to mentally
construct and socially represent individual-specific patterns in behaviour in some
nonhuman species already tens of thousands of years ago. Very likely, pertinent
representations and semiotic symbols referring to their conspecific individuals had
already been developed before.
Individual members of many nonhuman species also develop representations, such
as of their environment (Tolman 1948). In some species, in particular those with
complex social systems, individuals also develop socially shared representations as
reports on community formation and intercommunity warfare in chimpanzees suggest
(Goodall 1986; Standford 1998). Individual members of some animal species develop
representations that are socially shared even with humans, among them bonobos
(Savage-Rumbaugh and Fields 2000), gorillas (Patterson and Linden 1981), dogs
(Kaminski et al. 2004), and grey parrots (Pepperberg 2002). But none of these species
have developed complex semiotic systems on their own so far. Without pertinent
semiotic systems, however, the development and propagation of socially shared
representations is substantially impeded.
Whether some nonhuman species are able to recognise and mentally construct
individual-specific patterns of behaviour among their conspecifics is still unknown.
Evidence of individualised dyadic relationships among nonkin (e.g., in Rhesus
macaques; Weinstein and Capitanio 2008, 2012) suggests some degrees of pertinent
abilities at least in nonhuman primates. But more research on the abilities that are
prerequisites for such abilities (e.g., perception of fluctuating phenomena, perception
of time, see above) is needed. For example, many animal species perceive their
environments in far greater detail than most humans are able to (Grandin and
Johnson 2005), such as chimpanzees that have been shown to have eidetic working
memories (Inoue and Matsuzawa 2007). Brunswik’s (1952) concept of narrow
perceptual lens filters shifting flexibly across the environment may not apply well
to them. On the one hand, these abilities may allow these nonhuman species to
perceive individual behaviours more accurately than humans. But on the other hand,
this massive amount of information and their more limited capacity for information
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processing and long-term memory may hinder their ability to recognise and construct
individual-specific patterns in these perceptions (see above). Research on the perti-
nent abilities of humans who have eidetic perceptual or memory abilities (e.g., some
people on the autistic spectrum) can provide important insight in this regard.
But perhaps nonhuman species’ lack of language or of a similarly efficient
semiotic system to exchange information about individuals and to enable abstract
thinking (Peirce 1902, CP 4.227; Vygotsky 1962) does not allow them to construct
individual-specificity in the highly abstract form that humans are able to.
Individualised relationships may indicate that individual members of some species
are able to construct that some specific others show particular behavioural regularities
towards them, which may allow some predictions of their future behaviour. But they
may perhaps not be able to construct that individuals in their social environment
generally differ from one another in particular ways without referring to specific
ones. Constructs of personality differences enable humans to quickly assess strangers
(McAdams 1994) based on category systems that have proven to be socially signif-
icant within the community. Along with the ability to form impressions of others
rapidly, which may have co-evolved dialectically, this allows people to gain some
cognitive control of interactions with unknown individuals (cf. Goldberg 1981).
Maybe the ability to construct personality differences is an essential cognitive tool
that enables humans to deal with anonymous others, which seems to be a uniquely
human ability (cf. Blaffer-Hrdy 2009) at least among mammalian species. This
hypothesis shall be called the personality-constructs-promote-peaceful-anonymous-
contacts hypothesis. It suggest that ancestral humans must have developed these
abilities at least when they began dealing with unknown individuals outside their
particular community on a more regular basis, such as for peaceful traffic, exchange,
and trade, for which direct archaeological evidence exists.
Humans of the present day are born into a world full of complex semiotic systems
and social representations. Individuals’ own perceptual constructs, those that are
socially shared within their sociocultural community, and their lexical encodings
therefore develop in tight dialectical interplays with one another and cannot be
disentangled anymore (Lahlou 1996, 2001, 2008). They also develop in dialectical
interplays with the individual-specific patterns in behaviours and in outer appearances
to which they refer. Individuals like to belong and therefore adjust their behaviours in
order to socially conform. At the same time, they like to set themselves apart as
individuals within their communities and to stress their individual-specificity—both
in behaviour and in an artificially modified outer appearance (though to different
degrees in different sociocultural communities). The possibility for semiotic ex-
change about individual differences may therefore have promoted individual diver-
sification in humans—as compared to other species that cannot directly communicate
about their perceptual constructs at the level of their constructed meaning. Instead,
they each have to develop these constructs individually based on their own
perceptions and interpretations of what they perceive. Consequently, the devel-
opment of semiotic systems could have been a driving force for individual
diversification during human phylogeny. This fascinating hypothesis, which
shall be called the language-promotes-individualisation hypothesis, can be investigated
only if research methodology is substantially enlarged and diverse species are studied
(see below).
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For modern personality psychology, semiotic exchange entails additional impor-
tant implications. Through semiotic exchange, scientific knowledge also becomes
disseminated to the public. Many scientific concepts—some as old as Galens’s four
temperamental types, others as scientifically contentious as Freud’s personality
theory—have become established parts of everyday psychological knowledge.
How scientific concepts disseminate in everyday psychology was studied in psy-
choanalytic concepts and their dissemination among the French public in the 1960s
(Moscovici 1961). Everyday psychologists learn about scientific developments
through the public media, education guidebooks, and popular science books. The
interest in personality is particularly lively given its importance in each individual’s
everyday life. Terms originating from science, such as melancholic, choleric,
extraverted, neurotic, or psychotic, are widely used in everyday psychology—
correctly or not—as are the ideas that childhood experiences and genetic inheri-
tance influence adult individual behaviour. The body of everyday psychological
knowledge is not free of scientific knowledge anymore as it may have been in
prehistoric times.
This has far-reaching implications for scientific personality psychology. If lexical
descriptions—in lexical approaches and in assessments—continue to be the primary
source of information for the scientific study of personality, this not only triggers
further explanatory circularity, but also leads to a growing convergence between
everyday psychological and scientific constructs of personality. As a result, scientific
concepts of personality increasingly appear to “explain” lexically encoded individual
differences better—in particular because (psychology) students comprise important
parts of empirical samples. Such findings suggest progress in science—when in fact
scientific understanding of the described phenomena has not necessarily advanced.
John B. Watson’s and Sigmund Freud’s theories of personality development had
profound (and fairly different) impacts on educational practices and on everyday
explanations of individual behaviour (Wiggins 2003). These practices and explan-
ations in turn may have influenced the individuals’ behaviours themselves—though
not necessarily in the ways postulated by these theories.
The strong focus of personality psychology on human language, be it through
lexical research or assessment methods, has hindered these illuminating insights. The
ancient philosopher Plato (428–348 BC) had already recognised that “one should
leave the study of words behind to investigate the realities expressed through them”
(Politeia, 438d2-439b8, cited in Bordt 1998, p. 156; translated). This is essential
because, when words are studied instead of real phenomena, criteria for judging
empirical results cannot be established because there will be only many different
names or descriptions for phenomena, but no way to decide which descriptions—if
any at all—should be accepted (Toomela 2011). Personality psychology should
finally explore the fascinating phenomena with which it concerns itself in their
entirety and from much broader perspectives than previously done.
Ten Desiderata for Future Research
It is not important that we better understand which particular behaviours socially
shared knowledge about personality allows us to predict or which minimal cues of
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whatever kind can activate this knowledge because these questions are intrinsically
circular (see Fig. 2). Studying global structures of everyday psychological knowledge
without setting them in relation to the particular contexts on which they depend is
also not very important to do. The “discovery” of five major dimensions has provided
merely a snapshot of the everyday psychological knowledge that particular semiotic
communities had encoded about individuals in particular sociocultural environments
and in particular historic times.
It is essentially important, however, to fully consider in their entirety the meta-
theoretical assumptions that underlie the lexical hypothesis, to systematically test the
hypothesis using inductive approaches, and to move personality psychology beyond
this particular hypothesis to create new knowledge. Ten desiderata are thereby
primary.
Desideratum 1: A Philosophy-of-Science Framework for Personality Psychology
A comprehensive philosophy-of-science framework that explicitly incorporates seven
central issues (a – g in the following) should be developed.
a) Meta-theoretical definitions of the scientific phenomena constructed as person-
ality, i.e., of individual-specific patterns in behaviour and outer appearance and
of the everyday psychological knowledge about such patterns, including speci-
fications of the principles and conditions for their demarcation from real phe-
nomena and specifications of their ontology. For individual-specific patterns in
behaviour, such a meta-theoretical framework has already been elaborated (see
above, Uher 2011a) and successfully applied in empirical studies on capuchin
monkeys (Uher et al., Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality
differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult capu-
chin monkeys (Cebus apella), unpublished) and great apes (e.g., Uher et al.
2008). This framework comprises principles for defining behavioural phenomena
(Uher, What is behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A meta-theoret-
ical definition, unpublished) and for defining entities (i.e., categories) among
their qualitative elements (Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity
versus subjectivity in quantifications of behaviour and personality, unpublished).
It explicitly considers both within- and between-individual variations in the
contexts of situations, within-species populations (e.g., cultures), and species
using ipsative-normative-populative-speciative approaches (Uher, An integrative
meta-theoretical framework for research on individual behaviour in context—
situations, populations, species, unpublished). To differentiate between the dif-
ferent sets of phenomena to which the lexical hypothesis refers, the framework
relies on two meta-theoretical kinds of taxonomic personality constructs—one
for the phenomena of encoded knowledge and one for the phenomena that this
knowledge is about (i.e., scientific-statistical second-order and first-order con-
structs; Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in
quantifications of behaviour and personality, unpublished). Corresponding
frameworks for individual-specific patterns of outer appearance and for the
pertinent everyday psychological knowledge still have to be elaborated. The
development of these frameworks can capitalise on the meta-theoretical
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elaborations of individual-specificity in the dynamic and fluctuating phenomena
outlined above, but should also draw on developments made by other disciplines
that study physical appearance (e.g., research on kin recognition and attractive-
ness) and language and knowledge systems (e.g., psycholinguistics, semiotics,
computational linguistics).
b) Questions that can be asked about the thus-defined scientific phenomena.
Tinbergen’s (1963) four key questions about the causation, ontogeny, adaptivity,
and phylogeny, originally formulated for the species-level study of behaviour,
constitute meaningful directions also for the individual-level study of behaviour
(Uher 2008a, 2011a) and outer appearance. They can also be applied in part to
study the systems of everyday psychological knowledge about individuals, the
systems of their semiotic encodings, and the sociocultural and historic variations
in these systems.
c) Methodological approaches to decide which elements of real phenomena to
select for scientific studies. The methodological approaches previously used to
guide the selection of elements of everyday psychological knowledge and of
behaviour have already been analysed for their underlying meta-theoretical
assumptions (Uher 2008a, 2011a, b; Uher, Methodological approaches to per-
sonality taxonomies: The Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations
Approach—A non-lexical alternative, unpublished). These approaches can be
categorised into different classes depending on their selection rationales (e.g.,
manifest system approaches, top-down/etic approaches). These rationales build
on two meta-theoretical selection principles (i.e., content-based and strategy-
based) that differ in their ability to reduce the influence of the researchers’ own
everyday psychological ideas about personality in the very process of element
selection. Lexical approaches, for example, are manifest system approaches that
base element selection on scientifically reduced (i.e., manifest) language systems.
Their rationale formulates a selection strategy that demarcates all person-
descriptive words in the lexica as the universe of elements without suggesting
the study of any particular ones.
To establish comprehensive taxonomies of individual-specific behaviours, a
new manifest system approach that is grounded in the above-mentioned meta-
theoretical framework (Desideratum 1a)—the Behavioural Repertoire x
Environmental Situations Approach (Uher 2008a, b, 2011a, b; Uher,
Methodological approaches to personality taxonomies: The Behavioural
Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach—A non-lexical alternative,
unpublished)—has been developed. This approach bases element selection on
the behavioural-ecological systems of a population or species as far as these have
already been scientifically reduced (i.e., are manifest). It formulates a systematic
strategy to generate constructs and select their operationalisations based on the
established scientific descriptions of the average individual’s behaviours and of
the environmental situations in which these typically occur. In line with the
philosophy of science outlined above, these constructs and the taxonomic con-
structs that can be empirically derived from them are descriptive; they are not
ascribed an a priori causal status. As is true for any research, this approach
necessarily relies on language. But in contrast to lexical approaches, it is not
guided by the lexical encodings of lay people’s representations in which
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descriptions of behaviour are often blended with interpretations, appraisals, and
explanations and loaded with implicit sociocultural meanings. This new approach
has already been successfully applied in studies on capuchin monkeys (e.g., Uher
et al., Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality differences
obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella), unpublished) and great apes (Uher 2011b; Uher et al. 2008) in
which it yielded substantial empirical evidence for individual-specific patterns in
behaviour not previously described by other approaches, including those derived
from human everyday language. Corresponding methodological approaches for
taxonomising individual-specificity in outer appearance should be developed by
capitalising on the expertise of other disciplines (cf. Desideratum 1a).
d) Methods of investigation describing a portfolio of diverse techniques of how the
selected elements of real phenomena can be converted into quantifiable entities
and encoded as data, including the meta-theoretical assumptions underlying
these conversion decisions. The meta-theoretical assumptions underlying these
decisions in investigations of individual-specific patterns in behaviour were
already elaborated using set-theoretic considerations (Uher, Meta-theoretical
foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in quantifications of behaviour
and personality, unpublished). They include principles of how the quantitative
properties of qualitatively defined entities (cf. Desideratum 1a) can be encoded
as data based on established ethological techniques (e.g., Lehner 1998). This
allows for the explicit and systematic definition of all considered elements of the
set B of behaviours, the set S of situations that functionally mediate these
behaviours, the set T of occasions and spans of time in which they are measured,
and the set I of individuals in which they are studied. The interrelations of these
elements within and among these four sets can therefore be analysed for
individual-specific patterns using ratio-scaled measurements in set-theoretically
objective ways (Uher, Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjec-
tivity in quantifications of behaviour and personality, unpublished). Principles
for establishing functional and structural comparability of thus-derived taxonom-
ic constructs of individual-specificity furthermore allow for set-theoretically
objective comparisons between populations (e.g., cultures) and species (Uher,
An integrative meta-theoretical framework for research on individual behaviour
in context—situations, populations, species, unpublished). Similar principles
should be elaborated for investigations of individual-specific patterns in outer
appearance by drawing on the pertinent expertise of other disciplines (cf.
Desiderata 1a, 1c).
In assessment-based investigations, the encoding of qualitative and quantitative
properties of the selected elements into data largely relies on implicit decisions by
lay people. The particular elements of the sets B, S, T, and I that people consider
in their representations and assessments are thus ill defined, as are the elements of
the sets of interpretations, appraisals, and explanations that these may comprise.
Everyday psychological knowledge should therefore be analysed by using qual-
itative methods (e.g., Diriwächter et al. 2004; Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011) and
lexical analyses of texts, conversations, and reports obtained in everyday life
(e.g., with methods of computational linguistics; Bolden and Moscarola 2000)
that allow for the explication of the conversion and encoding decisions made.
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e) Meta-theoretical principles for the reduction, analysis, and theoretical interpre-
tation of data, including the formal-logical operations that are enabled by the
encoded phenomena to explore possible causal relations and internal systemat-
ics. These principles should be elaborated and matched purposefully to the meta-
theoretical properties of the phenomena that are reflected by the data (see
Desiderata 1c and 1d; Toomela 2011). For example, the mathematical algorithms
of the statistical techniques used to develop taxonomic models capitalise on
redundancies in the information encoded by the analysed variables (e.g., factor
analysis). Lexical factor models thus reflect individual differences for which many
synonyms or near-synonyms exist, but they likely miss out on those that are not
redundantly expressed in everyday language (Block 2010). This may impose
serious threats to the representativeness of lexical factor models because “it is
not always the case that the number of synonyms for a word testifies to the
psychological importance of that word. Certain words—crucial words—do not
need to be redundantly expressed” (p. 3). Important interpersonal perceptions may
instead be encoded in idioms and proverbs, rather than in single-word terms.
This is an important issue for any kind of taxonomic research that is based on
statistical methods. Assessment tools are developed by selecting variables that yield
data with high internal consistency and that thus measure the same concept—i.e.,
redundancies (Block 2010). But in behaviour, redundancies may be rare and con-
strained by evolutionary processes (Uher et al., Contextualised behavioural meas-
urements of personality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social
observations in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), unpublished). In fact, it
is well known in psychology that the cross-situational consistency of individual
behaviour is often only moderate (Mischel 1968). Even within a given situation, the
internal consistency of behaviours that are assigned to the same construct in both
everyday and scientific psychology is often low to zero, such as with regard to gaze
aversion, long pauses in speech, hesitant speaking, and restricted gestures all of
which are assigned to the construct of “shyness” (Asendorpf 1988).
In a nutshell, it must be considered that behavioural data have different properties
than assessment data because they capture different kinds of phenomena. The
distributional patterns of behavioural events may differ from those of the mental
representations that people develop of them. Behavioural measurements may not
fulfil the psychometric standards that have been established for assessments that use
predefined scales. This need not indicate insufficient utility for scientific investiga-
tions, but instead may reflect real patterns that are important and should be
researched (Fenson et al. 2000). The normal curve distributions of individual scores
that are frequently assumed for the five major dimensions (Jang et al. 2002; Loehlin
et al. 1998) might simply result from processes of mental information processing,
from the limited response formats of questionnaires, and from the artificial selection
of only those questionnaire items that yield such distributional patterns in the target
population (Uher et al., Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality
differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult capuchin
monkeys (Cebus apella), unpublished).
To meet these challenges, new meta-theoretical principles of data reduction
have been proposed within the framework of the Behavioural Repertoire x
Environmental Situations Approach (Uher,Methodological approaches to personality
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taxonomies: The Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach—
A non-lexical alternative, unpublished; Uher et al., Contextualised behavioural
measurements of personality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social
observations in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), unpublished). They
allow researchers to employ a two-step reduction procedure. First, behavioural
data are reduced based on the particular behaviours’ scientifically established
functional importance—regardless of potentially low internal consistencies among
behavioural measurements. Then the thus-derived composite measures of func-
tionally defined constructs (rather than the raw behavioural data) are subjected to
statistical reduction techniques. The first reduction step corresponds to the
intuitive processes of mental (re)construction, but is, in contrast to them, made
explicit and based on scientific knowledge. This step can therefore always be
traced and reconsidered if needed.
Statistical principles of data analyses should also be reconsidered with regard
to within-individual variability. Prevailing methods are based on the meta-
theoretical assumption that variability reflects variance derived from measurement
error and from random variation around a hypothetical true score (i.e., a “trait”).
But variability can be an important phenomenon in itself. Dynamic system
theories, for example, consider variability to be a driving force of development
and a potential indicator of ongoing processes. Studying variation patterns can
therefore offer important insights into how individuals change and develop
(Thelen and Smith 1993). Analytical principles that are adapted to the develop-
mental nature of behavioural phenomena—and thus of personality—and that
allow for analyses of variability should be further developed (see van Geert and
van Dijk 2002).
Finally, interpretations should carefully consider what phenomena the obtained
data (can) actually reflect (Gillespie and Zittaun 2010; Køppe 2012; Toomela
2011; Valsiner 2012). For example, analyses of lay people’s assessments cannot
reveal the relative contributions of genetic inheritance of and environmental
influence on individual differences nor can they be insightful about their evolu-
tionary genetics because assessments capture everyday psychological knowledge
structures. This knowledge is transmitted nongenetically through behavioural and
symbolic inheritance systems (Jablonka and Lamb 2005). The results reported in
pertinent assessment studies can thus mean two things. If—despite fragmentary
human perception, imperfect mental (re)construction, and socioculturally negotiat-
ed ascriptions of meaning— this knowledge accurately captures some real struc-
tures in the phenomena about which it has been developed, then they are
promising. But if—through mental and social (re)construction—this knowledge
reflects more structure than there actually is in the phenomena that are being
constructed or if it reflects structures in phenomena other than the phenomena that
this knowledge is assumed to be about, then these results may be misleading.
Psychologists can find this out only if they study the phenomena that can be
influenced directly and indirectly by genetic transmission (e.g., physiology, be-
haviour) rather than the pertinent symbols and representations that lay people
develop of them.
f) Scientific language. A scientific language that transcends common sense and that
encodes knowledge in specially established sign systems should be developed
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purposefully for personality psychology as has already been done for the (hard)
natural sciences (cf. Valsiner 2012). For example, although the statistical deriva-
tion of taxonomic personality constructs is described explicitly and precisely in
lexical research (e.g., with factor loadings), their meanings remain implicit
because they are derived from abstract everyday psychological terms. These
terms cannot be easily traced to concrete perceivable phenomena anymore and
are loaded with implicit meanings that are specific to particular sociocultural
communities. Instead, terminology for personality constructs that begins with
specific terms and constructs that are close to the directly perceivable qualitative
and quantitative properties of the defined study phenomena for encoding the data
should be developed (cf. Desideratum 1d). Then, these specific constructs should
be processed during the reduction and analysis of the data using formal-logical
operations to generate in a stepwise fashion more abstract and complex constructs
that can be clearly traced to the concrete references from which they were
derived. For these traceable constructs, abstract, complex, and even new terms
should be developed for scientific psychology. This will help to reduce the
unintended confusion with everyday psychological terms that all personality
researchers have in their minds as well. For example, thus-derived complex
constructs of individual-specific patterns of behaviour can be labelled based on
the bio-psycho-socio-ecological functions of the particular behaviours and envi-
ronmental situations to which they refer (Uher 2008b; Uher et al., Contextualised
behavioural measurements of personality differences obtained in behavioural tests
and social observations in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), unpublished).
g) Structures that allow for the constant scrutinising of epistemology, ontology, and
specific theories that have been developed about the phenomena studied. Meta-
theoretical (Toomela 2011), cultural and ethical structures that facilitate discus-
sions at the philosophy-of-science level and that help to delimit the paradigmatic
and ideological practices that hinder intellectual innovation should be established
in psychology communities and their publication media. Among all seven issues,
this may be the most difficult to achieve.
Desideratum 2: Comprehensive Taxonomies of Individual-Specific Patterns
in Behaviour and of Individual-Specific Patterns in Outer Appearance
The structures of individual-specific patterns in behaviour and in outer appearance are
still largely unknown (cf. Uher 2008a, b; Westen 1996). They should be researched
and taxonomised using the philosophy-of-science framework outlined above
(Desideratum 1) to the same systematic and comprehensive extent as has already
been done for the knowledge structures of some language communities—for humans
and for some other species as well. Three issues must be considered.
a) Behaviour is a phenomenon of the present and thus requires realtime recording.
To capture the defined elements of behaviour in the flow of events, methods that
help reduce the limitations that are entailed by human perceptual abilities and by
the actions required for recording what is perceived should be used and further
developed. For example, computerised life observations, video techniques, and
software-assisted coding techniques enable the creation of detailed records of
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complex and quickly occurring events (e.g., Uher et al. 2008; Uher et al.,
Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality differences obtained in
behavioural tests and social observations in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella), unpublished). Methods of first-person recording (Lahlou 2011a, b) and
of ambulatory monitoring (Fahrenberg and Myrtek 2001; Fahrenberg et al. 2007)
enable computerised measurements of ongoing behaviours in daily life settings.
Studies on outer appearances could employ photographical techniques.
b) Individual-specific patterns are temporal phenomena and are thus not phenomena
of the present. Their identification requires repeated measurement occasions over
time and posterior statistical analyses; they cannot be measured directly (Uher,
Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in quantifications
of behaviour and personality, unpublished).
c) Phenomena of behaviour and of artificially modified outer appearance must be
studied in the contexts in which they emerge. As phenomena that are functionally
mediated by the present environment (Uher, What is behaviour? And (when) is
language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, unpublished), behaviour and
artificially modified outer appearance must be studied together with the contexts
in which they emerge, such as particular situations, groups, populations (e.g.,
nations, sociocultural, or semiotic communities), times (e.g., generations, histor-
ical eras), and species. This requires taxonomic approaches for categorising
contexts. Such can be taken and further developed from approaches that are
designed to study the behavioural contexts of average individuals, such as from
behaviour setting theory (Barker 1968; Schoggen 1989), world installation
theory (Lahlou 2008; 2011a), cross-cultural psychology (Berry et al. 2011),
and behavioural ecology. This also includes analyses of the similarities and
differences of the obtained taxonomic structures of individual-specific behav-
iours and outer appearances within and across contexts to identify patterns that
are specific to particular contexts or universal across multiple defined contexts
(e.g., situations, sociocultural and semiotic communities, species; Uher 2008a, b,
An integrative meta-theoretical framework for research on individual behaviour
in context—situations, populations, species, unpublished).
Desideratum 3: Analyses of the Relations Between the Taxonomic Structures
of Individual-Specific Behaviours and those of Individual-Specific Outer Appearances
The identified taxonomic structures of individual-specific patterns in behaviour and in
outer appearances should then be analysed purposefully and systematically for interrela-
tions between them. The background of defined contexts in which they have been studied
(e.g., situations, groups, populations, times, species) must thereby be carefully considered.
Desideratum 4: Analyses of How People Perceive and Construct Structures
of Individual-Specific Patterns of Behaviour and of Outer Appearance
Still little is known about what exactly people perceive in individual behaviour and in
outer appearance in everyday life, and about what specific communities actually
consider salient and relevant. “Although [the lexical hypothesis] is reasonably clear,
the criteria of importance that have shaped the personality lexicons of everyday
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people are not well understood” (John et al. 1988, p. 175). For example, within-
individual variance often considerably exceeds between-individual variance in
humans (Shweder and Sullivan 1990) and also nonhuman species (Uher, An integra-
tive meta-theoretical framework for research on individual behaviour in context—
situations, populations, species, unpublished). But still, between-individual variabil-
ity seems to be more salient to human minds and more central to pertinent represen-
tations. What actually happens during the processes of the perception and mental
(re)construction of the perceived phenomena that this is possible? The concept of
time-relative probabilities allows researchers to determine the magnitudes of within-
individual and between-individual variation (measured in set-theoretically objective
ways, cf. Desideratum 1d) that particular people—both individuals and communities
—perceive as salient in other humans and in some other species (Uher et al., Through
the human personality glasses: Constructed personality taxonomy and typology in
Crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis), their crossmethod coherences and 24-
month stabilities, unpublished). Researchers should also study how people construct,
interpret, appraise, explain, and represent the perceived (see e.g., Laucken 1974), and
in which ways this may be different in different contexts (e.g., cultures and semiotic
systems). In a nutshell, the processes of perception and mental and social construction
that create such knowledge and their lexical encodings—rather than just their out-
comes—should be systematically studied (Gillespie and Zittaun 2010; Jovchelovitch
2007; Komatsu 2012; Pillai 2012; Rosenbaum and Valsiner 2011; Westen 1996). A
portfolio of methods (see Desideratum 1d) should thereby be used, qualitative and
microgenetic ones in particular (Wagoner 2009; Valsiner 1998).
Desideratum 5: Comprehensive Taxonomies of Everyday Psychological Knowledge
About Individual-Specific Patterns of Behaviour and of Outer Appearance
The pertinent bodies of everyday psychological knowledge have so far been taxon-
omised primarily by beginning with the systems of their lexical encodings (John et al.
1988). An entirely alternative strategy that begins with the phenomena that are
represented in this knowledge (i.e., from behaviours and outer appearances) should
be pursued. To taxonomise behaviour-related everyday psychological knowledge, the
Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach (cf. Desideratum 1a)
can be applied. For such investigations, the elements selected from the scientifically
described behavioural ecology of a population or species are described in the
everyday language of the target community. It is thereby important to use specific
terms and descriptions that are close to perceivable qualitative properties (e.g., in
contextualised behaviour-descriptive verb sentences). These descriptions can then be
used in empirical investigations of pertinent representations using assessment meth-
ods or qualitative methods (see Desideratum 1d). This approach has already been
applied to study (using assessments) the representations that human observers devel-
op about individual-specific behaviours in other species; specifically those that zoo
keepers developed about great ape individuals (Uher and Asendorpf 2008) and those
that students and researchers developed about individual crab-eating macaques (Uher
et al., Through the human personality glasses: Constructed personality taxonomy and
typology in Crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis), their crossmethod coher-
ences and 24-month stabilities, unpublished). Similar approaches should be used to
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taxonomise everyday psychological knowledge about individual-specific outer
appearances. Ideally, taxonomising knowledge structures should be based on the
empirically established comprehensive taxonomies of individual-specific behaviours
and outer appearances and on the knowledge about their empirical interrelations (see
Desiderata 2 and 3). But because these are difficult to establish given the enormous
logistic efforts required, the aforementioned approach will provide a viable alterna-
tive until such taxonomies can be established empirically.
In addition to descriptions, researchers should systematically study patterns of
interpretation, appraisal, and explanation and compare them among sociocultural and
language communities. Such analyses can be done only with qualitative methods, e.g.,
using interviews or analyses of texts, conversations, and reports (Lahlou 2011a). For
example, Laucken (1974) systematically collected and catalogued all verbal manifes-
tations of lay psychology explanations and predictions of human behaviour, such as in
newspapers and everyday conversations that he came across over a period of 1.5 years.
Then he analysed and categorised the structures and the conceptual elements underlying
these verbal manifestations to reconstruct the “naïve behaviour theory” that people were
using in everyday life in the population that he studied at the time of his investigation.
Desideratum 6: Analyses of the Relations Between the Taxonomic Structures
of Everyday Psychological Knowledge and Those of Individual-Specific Behaviours
and of Individual-Specific Outer Appearances
The taxonomies of everyday psychological knowledge should be set systematically in
relation to the taxonomised structures of behaviours and outer appearances to explore
convergences and divergences therein both within and between different cultural and
semiotic communities. Such analyses will unravel how taxonomies about everyday
psychological knowledge and those derived from their lexical encodings actually
represent individual-specific patterns in behaviour and in outer appearance; the ways
in which they may reflect different perceptions, interpretations, appraisals, and
explanations; and how this may vary within and among different sociocultural and
language communities. The above-mentioned studies on the representations of hu-
man observers of great apes and crab-eating macaques found systematic coherence
between the human observers’ pertinent represented knowledge and contextualised
measurements of individual-specific behaviours (likewise selected using the
Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach). But they also found
interesting deviations that provide insight into how humans may perceive and
(re)construct such patterns in these species (Uher 2011b).
Desideratum 7: Systematic Investigations of Causally Related Phenomena
The established descriptive-structural taxonomies of individual-specific behaviours
and of outer appearances and the taxonomies of the related contexts (cf. Desideratum
2c) should be used to guide causal-explanatory investigations of these phenomena.
This strategy has crucial advantages over approaches that begin with the causally
related phenomena themselves because behaviours, outer appearances, and environ-
ments are exterospectively accessible and can therefore be systematically categorised
and quantified in set-theoretically objective ways (see above). But this is not possible
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for psychological processes and for representations. Because they are not directly
perceivable; approaches that begin with these phenomena are prone to conceptual
biases on the part of the researchers. This is also in line with the methodological
insight made by social-cognitive personality theorists that descriptive-structural
investigations of behaviours in their situational contexts are essential for uncovering
the psychological processes through which distinctive individual behaviours emerge
and endure in specific situations (e.g., Wright and Mischel 1987; Wright and Zakriski
2003).
The phenomena that may be causally related to individual-specific behaviours
and outer appearances, and to their pertinent representations should be conceptually
integrated into the philosophy-of-science framework outlined above (for a meta-
theoretical definition of the psyche, see, e.g., Toomela 2010b). As with behavioural
and psychological phenomena, it is important to study the potential causes of
behaviours, outer appearances, and representations separately because they need
not be the same for these different kinds of phenomena (cf. Toomela 2011). For
example, the cognitive and social processes that create encoded knowledge struc-
tures (Witkowski and Brown 1978) can but do not necessarily causally influence
behaviours and outer appearances as well. Given their order of emergence in
ontogeny and phylogeny, they may not even be the primary causal influences of
behaviour. Research on nonhuman species can be particularly insightful in this
regard. Among causal phenomena internal to the individual, phenomena of phys-
iology, (neuro)anatomy, and genes can be measured quantitatively because these are
physical phenomena. But for investigations of psychological phenomena, three
important issues must be considered.
a) Most psychological processes are unconscious (Freud 1915). Individuals are
consciously aware of only small subsets of their psychological processes
(Westen 1996, 1999) and many of these processes cannot be easily verbalised
(Brower 1949; Kelly 1955; Komatsu 2012; Valsiner 2012).
b) Psychological phenomena are entirely internal and accessible only through
introspection. Psychological events cannot be perceived in other individuals
(Locke 1689; Toomela 2008, 2011). They can only be inferred from phenomena
that are external and that may mediate between an individual’s psychological
events and his or her environment (see above, Fig. 1), such as behavioural
phenomena and some parts of human language (Uher, What is behaviour? And
(when) is language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, unpublished). In
oneself, psychological events can be directly perceived—through introspection.
But scientific introspection imposes challenges because reflection and attention
inevitably introduce changes in the course of psychological events (Wundt
1904). Moreover, the results of introspection can be investigated only based on
their externalisation through behaviour and language. Direct investigations of
psychological phenomena are impossible.
c) Psychological phenomena are bound to the present and thus can be studied only in
the present (Gillespie and Zittaun 2010; Uher, What is behaviour? And (when) is
language behaviour? A meta-theoretical definition, unpublished; Valsiner 1998,
2012). Disentangling constructs about psychological phenomena (e.g., anxious-
ness) from ongoing events of psychological phenomena (e.g., experiencing anxiety
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in a given moment) is difficult because both are internal and are externalised
primarily in a verbal manner. For the phenomena of thought, this entails particular
difficulties because constructs are the memorised resultants of past thoughts (Peirce
1902, CP 2.84; Valsiner 2012). The lexical encodings used to externalise psycho-
logical events are constructs as well (Vygotsky 1962), including those that refer to
ongoing events of psychological phenomena. Given that one can never ascertain
whether words denoting particular psychological phenomena actually refer to
exactly the same phenomena in different individuals (Locke 1689, see above),
(re)constructions by investigators are inevitably involved in research on psycho-
logical phenomena.
The fact that all psychological phenomena are actualities and inherently bound to
the present (Gillespie and Zittaun 2010; Valsiner 1998, 2012) opens up some ways
—within the limitations mentioned— in which ongoing psychological events can
be distinguished from pertinent constructs because constructs inherently also in-
volve events from the past. As for behavioural phenomena, this requires realtime
investigations of ongoing psychological phenomena, such as through microgenetic
methods (Wagoner 2009) or methods of experience sampling in real-life settings
(Mehl and Connor 2012). But because psychological phenomena cannot be inves-
tigated directly, this requires that researchers differentiate their qualitative proper-
ties by explicitly categorising the phenomena through which they can be
externalised (see Desideratum 1d). These categories may refer, for example, to
particular information externalised in language (e.g., complains about pains,
expressed worries) or to nonverbal behaviours. Humans usually make these assign-
ments intuitively, for example, between behavioural and psychological assignments
as is apparent in concepts of “emotional behaviour” or “helping” that already
contain assumptions about underlying emotions or intentions. Because these
assumptions may be erroneous, in particular if individual members of other socio-
cultural communities and of other species are concerned, the assignment of extern-
alised phenomena to particular psychological phenomena should be made explicit
to enable continuous scrutinising. For quantifications of individual-specific pat-
terns, realtime records of events of externalisation categories should be repeatedly
obtained and accumulated over time. Probabilistic, differential, and temporal pat-
terns of their occurrences can then be quantified based on time-relative probabilities
(see above). Compared to the ease of obtaining lay people’s assessments, this may
appear to be a fairly cumbersome and rough way to investigate psychological
phenomena. But given their peculiarities, this may be the only way in which the
psychological phenomena themselves—rather than lay people’s knowledge about
them—can be somewhat quantified in set-theoretically objective ways.
Desideratum 8: Investigations of Ontogenetic Development
The development of individual-specific behaviours, outer appearances, pertinent
knowledge structures, and encodings should be studied systematically. Close atten-
tion should be paid to the fact that, in present-day humans, none of these patterns can
be explored and understood independently of the others because they always develop
in tight dialectic interplay. Methods of investigation and developmental theories must
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therefore be primarily dialectical rather than demonstrative as those currently prevail-
ing in psychology (Rychlak 1968; Sameroff 2010; Valsiner 2012). Particularly
illuminative are investigations of early ontogeny when the patterns of behaviour
and outer appearances of human individuals can be studied before and while these
individuals develop the abilities to mentally construct pertinent representations and
acquire complex repertoires of socioculturally shared meanings and symbols. The
influences of the latter should be explored in comparative investigations of a broad
range of human cultures (Keller 2007) by explicitly considering cultures that are
markedly different from the Western societies on which much of today’s personality
psychology is focused. Adult individuals should be studied with regard to their own
behaviours, outer appearances, and pertinent representations, but also with regard to
the representations that they develop about young children who do not yet share the
adults’ social representations comprehensively and whose behaviours are therefore
still not so strongly influenced by the sociocultural appraisals they comprise.
Research on various nonhuman species will illuminate patterns of ontogenetic
development of individual-specific behaviours (Suomi 2005) and also of individual-
specific outer appearances that may be universal to some groups of species. For
example, in various species such as horses and dogs, individuals with more gracile
bones and limbs also seem to differ in their individual-specific behaviours from
conspecifics that are more robust in their physical appearance (Grandin and
Johnson 2005). Furthermore, the abilities that are prerequisite for the recognition
and mental reconstruction of individual-specific patterns in behaviour should be
studied in various species as well as in humans with special abilities (e.g., eidetic
perception) or particular impairments (e.g., deficiencies in time perception).
Differences in these abilities should be set in relation to evidence that may indicate
the recognition and reconstruction of individual-specific patterns, such as individu-
alised dyadic relationships. Research on nonhuman individuals that have acquired
semiotic systems that are socially shared with humans can provide insights into the
role that language may have played in the development of pertinent abilities during
human evolution.
Desideratum 9: Alternative Conclusions from the Lexical Hypothesis
So far, psychologists have deduced just one conclusion from the lexical hypothesis
(i.e., all pertinent terms in the lexica constitute the universe of elements for empirical
studies). Alternative deductive conclusions should be derived systematically, such
that person perceptions may also be encoded in idioms and proverbs. In contrast to
single words, idioms and proverbs usually do not translate well; literal translations
often change their meaning or render them meaningless. What do these different ways
of encoding knowledge reveal about the different sociocultural and linguistic com-
munities and their ways of representing their social world?
Furthermore, inductive conclusions should be derived and facts should be sought
that may support or even falsify the hypothesis. For example, researchers should
purposefully study how people construct and encode the phenomena that they
perceive, even when these perceptions are not conscious (e.g., subliminal odours,
pheromones). The fact that within-individual differences are not mentioned in the
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lexical hypothesis should be scrutinised. Do people perceive and mentally represent
this at all? And do they notice that some individuals are more consistent within
themselves and across situations, whereas others are not both in humans (cf. Caspi
and Roberts 1999; Mischel et al. 2002) and in (at least some) nonhuman species as
well (Uher et al., Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality differences
obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella), unpublished)?
Desideratum 10: Alternative Nonlexical Hypotheses
Fundamentally new hypotheses about individual-specificity should be developed, in
particular about the theoretical nature of the phenomena in which it can be found,
why it emerges in these phenomena at all, and how. These questions can be explored
only if personality psychology dismisses its narrow research focus on Homo sapiens
and the phenomena reflected in its language.
The shift in perspective from humans to the enormous diversity of today’s
species opens a huge field of research that allows profound and illuminative
insights …. What is unique about Homo sapiens compared to all other species
in the phylogenetic tree? What personality [differences4] may have contributed
to Homo sapiens’ accelerated development in the most recent evolutionary past
and to its unmatched success in conquering almost every habitat on earth?
There is no better opportunity to understand the phylogenetic basis, adaptive
significance and ecological relevance of personality and its role in speciation
than studying the evolved diversity of species. (Uher 2008a, p. 427–428)
The much wider focus of cross-species comparative psychology may challenge
some deep-rooted ideologies about human personality. But it opens doors to alterna-
tive hypotheses that trigger new approaches and insights into the phylogenetic history
of these fascinating phenomena in humans and other species, such as the personality
constructs-promote-peaceful-anonymous-contacts hypothesis, the language-pro-
motes-individualisation hypothesis (see above), the central nervous system hypothe-
sis, or the motility hypothesis (Uher 2009) to name just a few. All these new
hypotheses—just as the lexical hypothesis is—are centred on the fascinating finding
that individual members of the human species as well as of other species develop
individual-specific styles of interaction with their environments that we construct as
personality.
Those who say it can’t be done are usually interrupted by others doing it.
(James Arthur Baldwin)
4 The attentive reader will notice that the article referred to here and some additional ones are written based
on the assumptions of trait psychology. This documents the educational origins of the author and the meta-
theoretical development of her work.
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